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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP 
 
CHAPTER 7 (2d ed) 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE 
 
LASERCOMB AMERICA, INC. v. REYNOLDS 
911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) 
 
SPROUSE, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellants Larry Holliday and Job Reynolds appeal from a district court 
judgment holding them liable to appellee Lasercomb America, Inc., for 
copyright infringement and for fraud, based on appellants’ unauthorized 
copying and marketing of appellee’s software. We affirm in part, reverse in 
part, and remand for recomputation of damages. 
 
Appellants and defendants below are Larry Holliday, president and sole 
shareholder of Holiday Steel Rule Die Corporation (Holiday Steel), and Job 
Reynolds, a computer programmer for that company. Appellee is 
Lasercomb America, Inc. (Lasercomb), the plaintiff below. Holiday Steel 
and Lasercomb were competitors in the manufacture of steel rule dies that 
are used to cut and score paper and cardboard for folding into boxes and 
cartons. Lasercomb developed a software program, Interact, which is the 
object of the dispute between the parties. Using this program, a designer 
creates a template of a cardboard cutout on a computer screen and the 
software directs the mechanized creation of the conforming steel rule die. 
 
In 1983, before Lasercomb was ready to market its Interact program 
generally, it licensed four prerelease copies to Holiday Steel which paid 
$35,000 for the first copy, $17,500 each for the next two copies, and $2,000 
for the fourth copy. Lasercomb informed Holiday Steel that it would charge 
$2,000 for each additional copy Holiday Steel cared to purchase. 
Apparently ambitious to create for itself an even better deal, Holiday Steel 
circumvented the protective devices Lasercomb had provided with the 
software and made three unauthorized copies of Interact which it used on its 
computer systems. Perhaps buoyed by its success in copying, Holiday Steel 
then created a software program called “PDS-1000,” which was almost 
entirely a direct copy of Interact, and marketed it as its own CAD/CAM die-
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1943154
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making software. These infringing activities were accomplished by Job 
Reynolds at the direction of Larry Holliday. 
 
There is no question that defendants engaged in unauthorized copying, 
and the purposefulness of their unlawful action is manifest from their 
deceptive practices. For example, Lasercomb had asked Holiday Steel to 
use devices called “chronoguards” to prevent unauthorized access to 
Interact. Although defendants had deduced how to circumvent the 
chronoguards and had removed them from their computers, they 
represented to Lasercomb that the chronoguards were in use. Another 
example of subterfuge is Reynolds’ attempt to modify the PDS-1000 
program output so it would present a different appearance than the output 
from Interact. 
 
When Lasercomb discovered Holiday Steel’s activities, it registered its 
copyright in Interact and filed this action against Holiday Steel, Holliday, 
and Reynolds on March 7, 1986. Lasercomb claimed copyright 
infringement, breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secret, false 
designation of origin, unfair competition, and fraud. Defendants filed a 
number of counterclaims. On March 24, 1986, the district court entered a 
preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants from marketing the PDS-1000 
software. 
 
The procedural history of this case is complex, with various claims and 
defenses experiencing both death and resurrection on various pretrial 
motions and at the bench trial itself. For purposes of this appeal it suffices 
to say that, ultimately, all of the counterclaims were dismissed; 
Lasercomb’s claims of misappropriation of trade secret, false designation of 
origin, and unfair competition were dismissed as preempted by the 
Copyright Act; the court found the defendants liable to Lasercomb for 
copyright infringement, rejecting their affirmative defenses of misuse of 
copyright and lack of statutory copyright notice; and the court held for 
Lasercomb on its claims of breach of contract and fraud. 
 
The district court awarded Lasercomb $105,000 in actual damages for 
copyright infringement and for fraud—with Holiday Steel, Holliday, and 
Reynolds jointly and severally liable—plus $10,000 against Holliday and 
$5,000 against Reynolds as punitive damages on the fraud claim. All 
defendants were permanently enjoined from publishing and marketing the 
PDS-1000 software. 
 
Holliday and Reynolds raise several issues on appeal. They do not 
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dispute that they copied Interact, but they contend that Lasercomb is barred 
from recovery for infringement by its concomitant culpability. They assert 
that, assuming Lasercomb had a perfected copyright, it impermissibly 
abused it. This assertion of the “misuse of copyright” defense is based on 
language in Lasercomb’s standard licensing agreement, restricting licensees 
from creating any of their own CAD/CAM die-making software. Appellants 
also argue that the district court’s finding of fraud was erroneously based on 
facts not alleged in the complaint. Finally, they contend that, even if they 
are liable, the district court erred in the calculation of damages. We consider 
these issues seriatim. 
 
A successful defense of misuse of copyright bars a culpable plaintiff 
from prevailing on an action for infringement of the misused copyright. 
Here, appellants claim Lasercomb has misused its copyright by including in 
its standard licensing agreement clauses which prevent the licensee from 
participating in any manner in the creation of computer-assisted die-making 
software. The offending paragraphs read: 
 
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement 
that it will not permit or suffer its directors, officers and 
employees, directly or indirectly, to write, develop, produce 
or sell computer assisted die making software. 
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and 
for one (1) year after the termination of this Agreement, that 
it will not write, develop, produce or sell or assist others in 
the writing, developing, producing or selling computer 
assisted die making software, directly or indirectly without 
Lasercomb’s prior written consent. Any such activity 
undertaken without Lasercomb’s written consent shall 
nullify any warranties or agreements of Lasercomb set forth 
herein. 
 
The “term of this Agreement” referred to in these clauses is ninety-nine 
years. Defendants were not themselves bound by the standard licensing 
agreement. Lasercomb had sent the agreement to Holiday Steel with a 
request that it be signed and returned. Larry Holliday, however, decided not 
to sign the document, and Lasercomb apparently overlooked the fact that 
the document had not been returned. Although defendants were not party to 
the restrictions of which they complain, they proved at trial that at least one 
Interact licensee had entered into the standard agreement, including the 
anticompetitive language. 
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The district court rejected the copyright misuse defense for three 
reasons. First, it noted that defendants had not explicitly agreed to the 
contract clauses alleged to constitute copyright misuse. Second, it found 
“such a clause is reasonable in light of the delicate and sensitive area of 
computer software.” And, third, it questioned whether such a defense exists. 
We consider the district court’s reasoning in reverse order. 
 
A. Does a “Misuse of Copyright” Defense Exist? 
We agree with the district court that much uncertainty engulfs the 
“misuse of copyright” defense. We are persuaded, however, that a misuse of 
copyright defense is inherent in the law of copyright just as a misuse of 
patent defense is inherent in patent law. 
 
The misuse of a patent is a potential defense to suit for its infringement, 
and both the existence and parameters of that body of law are well 
established. E.g., United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 
U.S. 457, 465 (1957); see generally 8 E. Lipscomb, Lipscomb’s Walker on 
Patents §§ 28:32–28:36 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter Walker on Patents]; 
Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and 
Noerr–Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust 
Counterclaims, 38 Drake L.Rev. 175 (1989) [hereinafter Calkins, Patent 
Law]. Although there is little case law on the subject, courts from time to 
time have intimated that the similarity of rationales underlying the law of 
patents and the law of copyrights argues for a defense to an infringement of 
copyright based on misuse of the copyright. E.g., United States v. Loew’s, 
Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44–51 (1962); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 
334 U.S. 131 (1948). The origins of patent and copyright law in England, 
the treatment of these two aspects of intellectual property by the framers of 
our Constitution, and the later statutory and judicial development of patent 
and copyright law in this country persuade us that parallel public policies 
underlie the protection of both types of intellectual property rights. We 
think these parallel policies call for application of the misuse defense to 
copyright as well as patent law. 
 
Supreme Court comment has likewise equated the public policies of 
copyright and patent. For example, in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 
(1953), the Supreme Court stated: 
 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction 
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is 
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
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authors and inventors in “Science and useful Arts.” 
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve 
rewards commensurate with the services rendered. 
 
The philosophy behind copyright, parallel to that discussed above for 
patent, is that the public benefits from the efforts of authors to introduce 
new ideas and knowledge into the public domain. To encourage such 
efforts, society grants authors exclusive rights in their works for a limited 
time. 
 
Although a patent misuse defense was recognized by the courts as early 
as 1917, most commentators point to Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 
U.S. 488 (1942), as the foundational patent misuse case. In that case, the 
plaintiff Morton Salt brought suit on the basis that the defendant had 
infringed Morton’s patent in a salt-depositing machine. The salt tablets were 
not themselves a patented item, but Morton’s patent license required that 
licensees use only salt tablets produced by Morton. Morton was thereby 
using its patent to restrain competition in the sale of an item which was not 
within the scope of the patent’s privilege. The Supreme Court held that, as a 
court of equity, it would not aid Morton in protecting its patent when 
Morton was using that patent in a manner contrary to public policy. The 
Court stated: 
 
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a 
patent monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right . . . ” to their 
“new and useful” inventions. United States Constitution, Art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8, 35 U.S.C. § 31. But the public policy which 
includes inventions within the granted monopoly excludes 
from it all that is not embraced in the invention. It equally 
forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or 
limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which 
it is contrary to public policy to grant. 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court endorsed “misuse of patent” as an equitable 
defense to a suit for infringement of that patent. 
 
Since Morton Salt, the courts have recognized patent misuse as a valid 
defense and have applied it in a number of cases in which patent owners 
have attempted to use their patents for price fixing, tie-ins, territorial 
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restrictions, and so forth. See Calkins, Patent Law, at 187–89 n. 38, 8 
Walker on Patents §§ 28:32–28:36; W. Holmes, Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust Law § 1.07 (1989) [hereinafter Holmes, Intellectual Property]. 
The patent misuse defense also has been acknowledged by Congress in the 
1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988) 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) & (5)), which limited but did not 
eliminate the defense. 
 
Although the patent misuse defense has been generally recognized since 
Morton Salt, it has been much less certain whether an analogous copyright 
misuse defense exists. See supra note 9. This uncertainty persists because 
no United States Supreme Court decision has firmly established a copyright 
misuse defense in a manner analogous to the establishment of the patent 
misuse defense by Morton Salt. The few courts considering the issue have 
split on whether the defense should be recognized, see Holmes, Intellectual 
Property § 4.09 (collecting cases), and we have discovered only one case 
which has actually applied copyright misuse to bar an action for 
infringement. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F.Supp. 843 
(D.Minn.1948), appeal dismissed, 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.1949). 
 
We are of the view, however, that since copyright and patent law serve 
parallel public interests, a “misuse” defense should apply to infringement 
actions brought to vindicate either right. As discussed above, the similarity 
of the policies underlying patent and copyright is great and historically has 
been consistently recognized. Both patent law and copyright law seek to 
increase the store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding inventors and 
authors with the exclusive rights to their works for a limited time. At the 
same time, the granted monopoly power does not extend to property not 
covered by the patent or copyright. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492; cf. Baker 
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–04 (1880). 
 
Thus, we are persuaded that the rationale of Morton Salt in establishing 
the misuse defense applies to copyrights. In the passage from Morton Salt 
quoted above, the phraseology adapts easily to a copyright context: 
 
The grant to the [author] of the special privilege of a 
[copyright] carries out a public policy adopted by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to [Authors] . . . the exclusive Right . . . ” to their 
[“original” works]. United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 
8. But the public policy which includes [original works] 
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within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not 
embraced in the [original expression]. It equally forbids the 
use of the [copyright] to secure an exclusive right or limited 
monopoly not granted by the [Copyright] Office and which it 
is contrary to public policy to grant 
. 
Having determined that “misuse of copyright” is a valid defense, 
analogous to the misuse of patent defense, our next task is to determine 
whether the defense should have been applied by the district court to bar 
Lasercomb’s infringement action against the defendants in this case. 
 
In declining to recognize a misuse of copyright defense, the district 
court found “reasonable” Lasercomb’s attempt to protect its software 
copyright by using anticompetitive clauses in their licensing agreement. In 
briefly expressing its reasoning, the court referred to the “delicate and 
sensitive” nature of software. It also observed that Lasercomb’s president 
had testified that the noncompete language was negotiable. 
 
If, as it appears, the district court analogized from the “rule of reason” 
concept of antitrust law, we think its reliance on that principle was 
misplaced. Such reliance is, however, understandable. Both the presentation 
by appellants and the literature tend to intermingle antitrust and misuse 
defenses. E.g., Holmes, Intellectual Property, at § 4.09. A patent or 
copyright is often regarded as a limited monopoly—an exception to the 
general public policy against restraints of trade. Since antitrust law is the 
statutory embodiment of that public policy, there is an understandable 
association of antitrust law with the misuse defense. Certainly, an entity 
which uses its patent as the means of violating antitrust law is subject to a 
misuse of patent defense. However, Morton Salt held that it is not necessary 
to prove an antitrust violation in order to successfully assert patent misuse: 
 
It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has 
violated the Clayton Act, for we conclude that in any event 
the maintenance of the present suit to restrain petitioner’s 
manufacture or sale of the alleged infringing machines is 
contrary to public policy and that the district court rightly 
dismissed the complaint for want of equity. 
 
So while it is true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate 
antitrust law probably would give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the 
converse is not necessarily true—a misuse need not be a violation of 
antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable defense to an infringement 
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action. The question is not whether the copyright is being used in a manner 
violative of antitrust law (such as whether the licensing agreement is 
“reasonable”), but whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative 
of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright. 
 
Lasercomb undoubtedly has the right to protect against copying of the 
Interact code. Its standard licensing agreement, however, goes much further 
and essentially attempts to suppress any attempt by the licensee to 
independently implement the idea which Interact expresses. The agreement 
forbids the licensee to develop or assist in developing any kind of 
computer-assisted die-making software. If the licensee is a business, it is to 
prevent all its directors, officers and employees from assisting in any 
manner to develop computer-assisted die-making software. Although one or 
another licensee might succeed in negotiating out the noncompete 
provisions, this does not negate the fact that Lasercomb is attempting to use 
its copyright in a manner adverse to the public policy embodied in 
copyright law, and that it has succeeded in doing so with at least one 
licensee. 
 
 The language employed in the Lasercomb agreement is extremely 
broad. Each time Lasercomb sells its Interact program to a company and 
obtains that company’s agreement to the noncompete language, the 
company is required to forego utilization of the creative abilities of all its 
officers, directors and employees in the area of CAD/CAM die-making 
software. Of yet greater concern, these creative abilities are withdrawn from 
the public. The period for which this anticompetitive restraint exists is 
ninety-nine years, which could be longer than the life of the copyright itself. 
 
We previously have considered the effect of anticompetitive language in 
a licensing agreement in the context of patent misuse. Compton v. Metal 
Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38 (4th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 968 
(1972). Compton had invented and patented coal auguring equipment. He 
granted an exclusive license in the patents to Joy Manufacturing, and the 
license agreement included a provision that Compton would not “engage in 
any business or activity relating to the manufacture or sale of equipment of 
the type licensed hereunder” for as long as he was due royalties under the 
patents. Suit for infringement of the Compton patents was brought against 
Metal Products, and the district court granted injunctive relief and damages. 
On appeal we held that relief for the infringement was barred by the misuse 
defense, stating: 
 
The need of Joy to protect its investment does not 
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outweigh the public’s right under our system to expect 
competition and the benefits which flow therefrom, and the 
total withdrawal of Compton from the mining machine 
business . . . everywhere in the world for a period of 20 years 
unreasonably lessens the competition which the public has a 
right to expect, and constitutes misuse of the patents. 
 
Id. at 45. 
 
We think the anticompetitive language in Lasercomb’s licensing 
agreement is at least as egregious as that which led us to bar the 
infringement action in Compton, and therefore amounts to misuse of its 
copyright. Again, the analysis necessary to a finding of misuse is similar to 
but separate from the analysis necessary to a finding of antitrust violation. 
The misuse arises from Lasercomb’s attempt to use its copyright in a 
particular expression, the Interact software, to control competition in an area 
outside the copyright, i.e., the idea of computer-assisted die manufacture, 
regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an antitrust violation. 
 
In its rejection of the copyright misuse defense, the district court 
emphasized that Holiday Steel was not explicitly party to a licensing 
agreement containing the offending language. However, again analogizing 
to patent misuse, the defense of copyright misuse is available even if the 
defendants themselves have not been injured by the misuse. In Morton Salt, 
the defendant was not a party to the license requirement that only Morton-
produced salt tablets be used with Morton’s salt-depositing machine. 
Nevertheless, suit against defendant for infringement of Morton’s patent 
was barred on public policy grounds. Similarly, in Compton, even though 
the defendant Metal Products was not a party to the license agreement that 
restrained competition by Compton, suit against Metal Products was barred 
because of the public interest in free competition. 
 
Therefore, the fact that appellants here were not parties to one of 
Lasercomb’s standard license agreements is inapposite to their copyright 
misuse defense. The question is whether Lasercomb is using its copyright in 
a manner contrary to public policy, which question we have answered in the 
affirmative. 
 
In sum, we find that misuse of copyright is a valid defense, that 
Lasercomb’s anticompetitive clauses in its standard licensing agreement 
constitute misuse of copyright, and that the defense is available to 
appellants even though they were not parties to the standard licensing 
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agreement. Holding that Lasercomb should have been barred by the defense 
of copyright misuse from suing for infringement of its copyright in the 
Interact program, we reverse the injunction and the award of damages for 
copyright infringement. 
 
Because of this holding, we do not reach the other defenses to copyright 
infringement advanced by appellants. Although we find misuse of 
copyright, we reject the contention of appellants—that they should recover 
attorney fees from Lasercomb under 17 U.S.C. § 505 because Lasercomb 
brought this action in bad faith. Given the conduct of defendants and the 
obscurity of their defenses, we find such a position completely untenable. 
 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1. Patent “misuse” is an entirely judge made doctrine with a long and 
troubled history.  As Lasercomb points out, it originated in the 1910s as a 
doctrine intended to permit patent “overreaching,” but then formed a sort of 
“partnership” with antitrust in the 1940s and after.  Indeed, the antitrust law 
of tying arrangements (see Chapter Two) very largely originated in the 
patent infringement lawsuits that gave rise to the patent misuse offense.  
Early patent misuse cases that refused to enforce tying conditions, such as 
Motion Picure Patents and Carbice (both printed in Chapter Two) gave lip 
service to the antitrust laws but were in fact patent law holdings.  Only in 
the International Salt case in the 1940s did the law of tying formally move 
from patent law (misuse) to antitrust law.  See International Salt Co. v. 
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).  The important consequence was that, 
while misuse is asserted mainly as a defense to an infringement action, the 
antitrust laws can be affirmatively be enforced by both the government and 
private plaintiffs.  
 
2. Lasercomb’s licensing agreement has been said to be a “model of 
overreaching.” Philip Abromats, Comment, Copyright Misuse and 
Anticompetitive Software Licensing Restrictions: Lasercomb America, Inc. 
v. Reynolds, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 629, 648 (1991). The terms of the license 
not only prohibited Holiday Steel, its directors, officers, and employees 
from “directly or indirectly” writing, developing, producing, or selling 
competing software—it prohibited them from “assist[ing] others” in doing 
so, and for up to a hundred years. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
correctly noted that these restraints would be in place long after 
Lasercomb’s copyright expired, but the restraints would also have stopped 
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Holiday Steel from developing—or helping to develop—new software even 
after Lasercomb’s product became obsolete. Abromats writes: 
“[E]nforcement of [such] an excessively-long noncompete agreement does 
nothing to protect the legitimate secrets of the licensor and unfairly burdens 
the original development efforts of the licensee. The practical effect of this 
[is] to limit competition and deprive the public of improved, less-expensive 
new products.” Noncompete clauses like Lasercomb’s prevent users like 
Holiday Steel—who are in a good position to spot “shortcomings in the 
product and opportunities for improvement that the original developer could 
not (or chose not) to envision”—from making the product better. This 
“withdraw[s] from the market the talents of those persons most able to 
contribute to the improvement of the product,” and the public is therefore 
“deprived of some innovations altogether and . . . obtain[s] others only at an 
unnecessarily high cost.”  
 
Did the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also go too far? In finding that 
Lasercomb had misused its copyright, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on 
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, in which the Supreme Court held that 
patent owners cannot sue for infringement when they use their patents to 
“secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent 
office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.” 314 U.S. 488, 492 
(1942). Morton Salt was decided during an era when the law presumed that 
patents gave their owners market power.  In 1988 Congress amended the 
patent laws to prohibit findings of misuse where patent owners engage in 
tying but do not have market power. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5). While 
Lasercomb’s noncompete clause did not contain a tie-in, it did involve “a 
closely analogous restriction, a tie-out.” James B. Kobak Jr., A Sensible 
Doctrine of Misuse for Intellectual Property Cases, 2 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 
1, 34 (1992).  But in applying Morton Salt Co., which completely bars 
patent holders from suing even direct infringers, the Fourth Circuit 
borrowed the logic of early patent-misuse cases but not the limits Congress 
and courts had imposed. See id. at 21, 34; but see Aaron Zavier Fellmeth, 
Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Monopoly, 6 J. 
Intell. Prop. L. 1, 28 (1998) (stating that while “[p]atentees have a statutory 
right to tie their patents to sales of other goods if they lack significant 
market power, copyright owners have no such immunity” Given that the 
doctrine of patent misuse spiraled out of (largely unfounded) fears that 
patent holders would use their patents to gain monopolies in other markets, 
does it make sense to apply Morton Salt Co.’s “deliberately severe rule” to 
copyrights, which “do not confer a fraction of the market power of a 
fundamental patent”? Kobak, supra, at 4, 32. But see id. at 32 (“Surely, 
however, some copyrighted creations such as computer software programs 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                         Chap. 7, Page 13 
Hovenkamp                                                                                          Dec. 2012 
 
or commercially important databases do permit the same sort of cost 
savings and may confer the same sort of market power.”); Fellmeth, supra, 
at 30 (arguing that “in the increasingly important software industry, a 
copyright can confer very significant market power”). 
 
The Fourth Circuit ultimately found that Larry Holliday never actually 
signed the licensing agreement and that Holiday Steel therefore wasn’t 
bound by it—that is, nothing stopped Holiday Steel from writing, 
developing, producing, or selling its own die-making software as long as it 
didn’t infringe Lasercomb’s copyright. But because Lasercomb had 
managed to get one other user to sign the unfair licensing agreement, the 
Fourth Circuit held that Lasercomb was barred from enforcing its copyright 
against any users, even outright infringers like Holiday Steel. Is this a good 
rule? See Mark A. Lemley, Note, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent 
Misuse Doctrine, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1599, 1610–13 (1990) (arguing that 
“[o]nly patent infringers benefit from the doctrine” and that “a defendant 
asserting patent misuse need not prove individual harm from the misuse at 
all. Instead, any defendant in an infringement action is protected from the 
suit if she can prove that the plaintiff misused the patent, even if the 
defendant was unaffected by the misuse”). Should the Fourth Circuit have 
limited the copyright misuse defense to infringers who are actually bound 
by the overly restrictive agreement? Professor Thomas Cotter notes that 
while most courts “follow Lasercomb and the patent misuse decisions in not 
requiring the defendant itself to be a victim of the misuse, there is a 
significant plurality of decisions that require some sort of ‘nexus’ between 
the IP plaintiff’s alleged misconduct and the IP dispute at issue.” Thomas F. 
Cotter, Misuse, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 901, 931 (2007).  
 
SENZA-GEL CORP. v. SEIFFHART 
803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
MARKEY, Chief Judge. 
Background 
Appellants (Senza-Gel) sued all appellees, asserting numerous claims 
under state and federal law. One such claim was for infringement of Senza-
Gel’s process patent No. 3,644,125. The district court separated the issues 
of patent validity and direct infringement for trial before all other issues. 
The jury returned a verdict that the patent was valid and infringed and the 
court denied Goehring’s motion for JNOV. Months later, appellees moved 
to amend their answer to add an allegation of patent misuse and an antitrust 
counterclaim. When that motion was granted, appellees (Goehring) filed 
motions for summary judgment of patent misuse and antitrust violation 
under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The court granted the former 
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and denied the latter. 
 
Before us, Senza-Gel challenges the grant of the motion to amend and 
the grant of summary judgment of patent misuse. Goehring seeks reversal 
of the denial of summary judgment of antitrust violation and a 
determination by this court that it had established certain elements of its 
counterclaim not reached by the district court. 
 
The district court extensively discussed the evidence, the law, and the 
parties’ arguments. Citing authorities, the court delineated the difference it 
correctly saw between patent misuse as a defense in a suit for patent 
infringement and as a basis for a complaint for antitrust violation. The court 
noted that the parties confused the two concepts (as they have on appeal), 
and that courts have done so as well. 
 
The court cited the license agreements and testimony of Senza-Gel’s 
principals (submitted at the patent issues trial as proof of commercial 
success of the patented process) as establishing Senza-Gel’s refusal to 
permit use of the process of the patent in suit unless the user leased Senza-
Gel’s “macerator” machine, and the undisputed fact that the process and 
macerator were always leased together. The absence of conflict between the 
jury verdict and the grant of summary judgment of misuse was noted. 
 
Reviewing legal history, the court discussed the “staple article of 
commerce” concept as it relates to contributory infringement, patent misuse, 
and antitrust. The court noted that Senza-Gel had insulated from review the 
validity of what it called its patent on the macerator. Having determined that 
Senza-Gel’s macerator was useful in non-infringing processes, the court 
found it a staple article, as was OHI’s machine that Senza-Gel called a 
“knock-off” of the macerator; the court then found that the process and the 
macerator (which performed one step of the process) were two “things”; 
and that those two things were “tied”. 
 
Because the parties had not raised the issue, the court declined to 
discuss any question of package licensing, but noted that the mere leasing 
together of the process and machine would not suffice if the effect were not, 
as it was here, to expand the “ambit” of the process patent. Senza-Gel’s sole 
argument (that no one asked to lease the process alone and there was thus 
no coercion) was rejected. 
 
Because Senza-Gel had submitted no evidence of business justification 
or other adequate response, the court concluded that no genuine issue of 
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material fact on the misuse issue was present. 
Noting that Senza-Gel had conditioned access to its process by requiring 
a lease of the macerator at prices making it uneconomical to lease the 
process and practice it with a different machine, and that Senza-Gel had 
thereby extended the scope of the process patent to cover the macerator, the 
court found misuse and granted Goehring’s motion for summary judgment. 
.. . 
[Misuse] 
 
Senza-Gel’s principals testified at trial that it never licensed or “leased” 
the process patent on which it was suing without leasing its “Macerator” 
machine useable in carrying out a step of the patented process, and it is 
undisputed that the process and machine were, as a matter of established 
policy, always leased together. Though Senza-Gel had obtained patent No. 
3,893,384, which it says covers its machine, it elected not to bring that 
patent into court and the district court referred to and treated the machine as 
unpatented for the purposes of this trial. Senza-Gel not only failed to 
involve its machine patent and to establish the relationship of that patent to 
the machine leased, it has failed to establish on this certified appeal that the 
district court was clearly erroneous in finding that the machine as leased 
was suitable for substantial non-infringing use and therefore a staple article 
of commerce. Both parties cite antitrust cases in contesting the merits of the 
grant of summary judgment of misuse. The parties thus fail to distinguish 
between patent misuse as a defensive shield and patent misuse as an 
offensive sword. In both cases, the patentee’s act is the same. That act may 
serve, as here, as a defense to a charge of patent infringement. That act may 
also serve as an element in a complaint charging antitrust violation. Thus, as 
the Supreme Court has said, the patentee’s act may constitute patent misuse 
without rising to the level of an antitrust violation. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969). All that a successful 
defense of patent misuse means is that a court of equity will not lend its 
support to enforcement of a mis-user’s patent. 
 
On the record before it, the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
on the defense of misuse was not in conflict with its denial of summary 
judgment on the counterclaim for antitrust violation. 
 
The sole argument made by Senza-Gel to the district court on the 
motion for summary judgment of misuse before that motion was granted 
was that there was “no evidence” that it had coerced lessees, who had thus 
entered “voluntary” leases….  The arguments that Senza-Gel did make 
before the district court (that its lessees acted voluntarily and that there was 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                            Chap. 7, Page 16 
Hovenkamp                                                                  Dec. 2012 
 
no evidence it ever “coerced” a lessee of the process) are refuted by the 
record. Its own witnesses said a lease of one was never available without a 
lease of the other, Senza-Gel submitted no evidence on voluntariness or on 
business justification, and a witness testified without contradiction that his 
express request to lease the process without the machine was refused by 
Senza-Gel. . . . 
 
[Antitrust] 
 
Here, the district court recognized several issues of fact that must be 
determined before one can be held liable for an illegal tying arrangement in 
violation of the antitrust laws. Because the district court determined that a 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether there was a tying 
arrangement consisting of two separate and distinct products for antitrust 
purposes, it held that determination dispositive of Goehring’s motion for 
summary judgment. The district court correctly determined there was 
therefore no need to examine whether there were other genuine issues of 
material fact in this case, e.g., sufficient economic power in the tying 
product, and an effect on a “not insubstantial” amount of commerce in the 
tied product market…. 
 
Goehring insists that this court hold “as a matter of law” that it had 
established the other factual requisites for establishing Senza-Gel’s 
violation of the antitrust laws. Matters of law rest, however, on facts 
determined. There is no basis for Goehring’s request, the district court 
having entered no findings on those elements and no finding that issues of 
material fact in relation to them are either present or absent, and this court 
having no authority to determine facts de novo. 
 
Concerning certified question No. 6, on determination of whether there 
are two separate and distinct products for antitrust purposes, Goehring 
argues that Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Products, Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 185 
USPQ 10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831 (1975), controls, and that the 
“key factor” in both antitrust and patent misuse contexts is whether the tied 
product was a “staple”, i.e., capable of non-infringing uses. Goehring 
contends that the district court erred in holding that a question of material 
fact concerning consumer behavior (character of demand) is involved in 
deciding its motion for summary judgment of antitrust violation. We 
disagree…. 
 
The district court here relied principally on Klamath-Lake 
Pharmaceutical Association v. Klamath Medical Service Bureau, 701 F.2d 
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1276 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983). In Klamath-Lake, the 
Ninth Circuit stated: 
 
Separateness is determined in part by whether the 
products are normally sold or used as a unit and whether 
their joint sale effects savings beyond those of combined 
marketing. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48 
(9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (describing 
the “function of the aggregate” test). The critical factor is the 
extent to which a producer’s offerings are in response to 
independently structured consumer demand. Products that 
function together and are sold in combination may still be 
“separate” if consumers would prefer to buy them 
individually at the price necessary to market them separately. 
Tying denotes illegal coercion: “Rules governing tying 
arrangements are designed to strike, not at the mere coupling 
of physically separable objects, but rather at the use of a 
dominant desired product to compel the purchase of a 
second, distinct commodity.” Id. at 47 (citing Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 
(1953)). Whether a producer’s combined products should be 
considered as separate can be decided only by looking at 
consumer behavior. It is the relationship of the producer’s 
selling decision to market demand, not the physical 
characteristics of the products alone, that determines the 
existence of legally separable products. 
 
Since Klamath-Lake, the Supreme Court has stated “that the answer to 
the question whether two products are involved turns not on the functional 
relationship between them, but rather on the character of the demand for the 
two items.” Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 
(1984) (footnote omitted). The Court noted that “a tying arrangement 
cannot exist unless two separate product markets have been linked.” There, 
the Court held that anesthesiological services were separate from hospital 
services because there was a “sufficient demand for the purchase of 
anesthesiological services separate from hospital services to identify a 
distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer anesthesiological 
services separately from hospital services.” 
 
Goehring has shown no basis for answering certified question No. 6 in 
the negative. Its effort to equate the determination of product separability 
for misuse purposes with product separability for antitrust purposes must 
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fail in light of Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court law, which requires that 
“consumer behavior” (market demand) be examined to determine the 
separability of products in determining whether there is a tying arrangement 
for antitrust purposes. Thus there is no conflict in the district court’s holding 
that there are two products sufficient to sustain a defense of patent misuse, 
and its determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists on whether 
there are two products for antitrust purposes. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
[A dissenting opinion by Judge Bennett, limited to procedural issues, is 
omitted.] 
 
NOTE:  
“SEPARATE PRODUCTS” UNDER MISUSE AND TYING LAW 
 
Patent law and antitrust frequently use the same concepts and terms but 
in different contexts and with different meanings. For example, as Senza-
Gel suggests, illegal tying requires (at least) two products in both patent law 
and antitrust. But each body of law applies its own test to determine 
whether there are two products. The infringement defendants in Senza-Gel 
accused Senza-Gel of tying leases of its unpatented machines to licenses of 
its patented process. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed 
summary judgment on the patent-misuse claim, apparently finding no flaws 
in the district court’s ruling that the process and the machine were “two 
products” for the purposes of a misuse defense or in the lower court’s 
holding that there were nevertheless genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether they were “two products” under antitrust law. The Federal Circuit 
was correct that a “patentee’s act may constitute patent misuse without 
rising to the level of an antitrust violation,” but does it make sense to apply 
two different separate-products tests? In a footnote omitted here, the court 
wrote that: 
 
[t]he law of patent misuse in licensing need not look to 
consumer demand (which may be non-existent) but need look 
only to the nature of the claimed invention as the basis for 
determining whether a product is a necessary concomitant of 
the invention or an entirely separate product. The law of 
antitrust violation, tailored for situations that may or may not 
involve a patent, looks to a consumer demand test for 
determining product separability. 
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Senza-Gel, 803 F.2d at 670 n.14 (emphasis added); see also Robert P. 
Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 J. 
Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 793 (1988) (“[T]he often very limited (or 
‘thin’) markets for patented technology make it difficult to apply antitrust 
law’s consumer-demand definition of the relevant market.”). On Senza-Gel 
and the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the separate-products issue, see 
generally Peter M. Boyle et al., Antitrust Law at the Federal Circuit: Red 
Light or Green Light at the IP–Antitrust Intersection?, 69 Antitrust L.J. 
739, 790–92 (2002) (“the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the ‘separate 
products’ standard remains confused” and that the court “has yet to clarify 
adequately how the misuse and antitrust standards may differ, if at all”). 
 
MONSANTO CO. v. SCRUGGS 
459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
MAYER, Circuit Judge. 
Background 
 
Monsanto owns U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (“the ’605 patent”), which is 
directed toward insertion of a synthetic gene consisting of a 35S cauliflower 
mosaic virus (“CaMV”) promoter, a protein sequence of interest, and a stop 
signal, into plant DNA to create herbicide resistance. Monsanto also owns 
U.S. Patent Nos. 5,164,316; 5,196,525; and 5,322,938 (collectively “the 
McPherson patents”), which are directed toward insect resistant traits. The 
McPherson patents expand upon the ’605 patent in several ways, including 
disclosure of an enhanced CaMV 35S promoter. 
 
Monsanto used the technology in the ’605 patent to develop glyphosate 
herbicide resistant soybeans and cotton, sold as Roundup Ready (R) 
soybeans and cotton. One of the glyphosate herbicides to which the 
Roundup Ready (R) plants are resistant is Roundup, which is also sold by 
Monsanto. Monsanto used the ’605 patent in combination with the 
McPherson patents to develop stacked trait cotton (“Bollgard/Roundup 
Ready (R) cotton”), which is resistant to glyphosate herbicide and certain 
insects. 
 
Monsanto began licensing its biotechnology to seed companies (“seed 
sellers”); it licensed Roundup Ready (R) technology starting in 1996 and 
Bollgard/Roundup Ready (R) cotton technology starting in 1998. The 
licenses allow seed growers to incorporate the Monsanto biotechnology into 
their germplasm to produce Roundup Ready (R) and Bollgard/Roundup 
Ready (R) seeds. The licenses also impose certain restrictions on seed 
sellers, including that seed companies may not sell seed containing 
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Monsanto’s technology to growers unless the grower signs one of 
Monsanto’s license agreements; and that seed so sold may be used by 
growers to grow only a single commercial crop. Monsanto’s restrictions on 
seed growers include: (1) requiring growers to use only seed containing 
Monsanto’s biotechnology for planting a single crop (“exclusivity 
provision”); (2) prohibiting transfer or re-use of seed containing the 
biotechnology for replanting (“no replant policy”); (3) prohibiting research 
or experimentation (“no research policy”); and (4) requiring payment of a 
“technology fee.” 
 
Scruggs purchased both Roundup Ready (R) soybean seeds and 
Bollgard/Roundup Ready (R) cotton seeds from seed companies, but never 
signed a licensing agreement. It planted the purchased seeds, and after 
harvesting the soybeans and cotton, retained the new generation of seeds. Its 
subsequent crops were planted with those retained seeds, as well as with 
seeds obtained from subsequent generations of crops. 
 
Monsanto investigated Scruggs’ activities and filed suit for infringement 
of the ’605 and McPherson patents. The trial court issued a preliminary 
injunction, prohibiting Scruggs from further sale and use of seeds 
containing Monsanto’s patented biotechnology. Scruggs answered with 
federal and state antitrust claims and patent misuse affirmative defenses. 
Specifically, it asserted that Monsanto violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–2, by tying the purchase of seed to the purchase of Roundup through 
grower license agreements, grower incentive agreements, and seed partner 
license agreements, as well as by tying the Roundup and Bollgard traits in 
cotton seeds. It also asserted Monsanto violated section 2 of the Sherman 
Act by unlawfully monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a relevant 
market…. 
 
Infringement occurs when a properly construed claim reads on the 
accused product. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont & De Nemours & Co., 
750 F.2d 1569, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1984). In this case, Monsanto must show that 
its Roundup Ready (R) and Bollgard/Roundup Ready (R) seeds are covered 
by the ’605 and/or McPherson patents and that Scruggs used those seeds in 
a way that violated Monsanto’s patent rights. Affirmative defenses to 
infringement include noninfringement, unenforceability, invalidity (e.g., 
failing to satisfy the written description or enablement requirements), see 35 
U.S.C. § 282, patent misuse, see Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 
(Fed.Cir.1986), and the existence of an implied license, see Carborundum 
Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, 72 F.3d 872, 878 (Fed.Cir.1995). 
 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                         Chap. 7, Page 21 
Hovenkamp                                                                                          Dec. 2012 
 
In granting Monsanto’s motion for summary judgment of infringement, 
the trial court relied on Scruggs’ admissions with respect to: (1) its 
purchasing of the Roundup Ready (R) soybeans and Bollgard/Roundup 
Ready (R) cotton; (2) its failing to obtain a license from Monsanto; and (3) 
its saving of soybean and cotton seed for future planting. Additionally, the 
court pointed to Monsanto’s scientific tests showing that Scruggs’ soybean 
and cotton crops contained Monsanto’s patented technology. Id. at 594. 
 
[The court found that Monsanto’s patents were valid and infringed.] 
 
Antitrust/Patent Misuse 
 
Antitrust laws may be violated if a patent holder’s conduct falls outside 
the protection afforded by the patent laws. United States v. Line Material 
Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948). Under the patent laws, a patentee has the 
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a patented invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). Conduct falling within the scope of protection 
includes, inter alia, limited use licensing, see Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, 
Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed.Cir.1992), and charging of royalties, Brulotte 
v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). Field of use licensing restrictions, i.e., 
permitting the use of inventions in one field and excluding it in others, are 
also within the scope of the patent grant. See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. 
W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce . . . is [] declared to be illegal.” Tying arrangements fall under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. “A tying arrangement is the sale or lease of 
one product on the condition that the buyer or lessee purchase a second 
product.” Breaux Bros. Farms, Inc. v. Teche Sugar Co., Inc., 21 F.3d 83, 85 
(5th Cir.1994). To prove that a tying arrangement exists, the plaintiff must 
show: (1) the involvement of two separate products or services; (2) the sale 
of one product or service is conditioned on the purchase of another; (3) the 
seller has market power in the tying product; and (4) the amount of 
interstate commerce in the tied product is not insubstantial. Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461–62 (1992). 
 
Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, unlawful monopolization is 
prohibited. To establish a section 2 violation, one must prove that the party 
charged had monopoly power in a relevant market and acquired or 
maintained that power by anti-competitive practices instead of by 
competition on the merits. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
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Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 (1985). 
 
Patent misuse may be found even where there is no antitrust violation, 
because “[p]atent misuse is . . . a broader wrong than [an] antitrust 
violation.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 
(Fed.Cir.1998). The “policy of the patent misuse doctrine is ‘to prevent a 
patentee from using the patent to obtain market benefit beyond that which 
inures in the statutory patent right.’ ” Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 
1336, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004) (quoting Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704 
(“Monsanto II ”)). In order for competitive behavior to amount to patent 
misuse, one must “impermissibly broaden[] the scope of the patent grant 
with anticompetitive effect.” Id. Thus, “[i]n the cases in which the 
restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, the patent misuse defense 
can never succeed.” Id. Moreover, “[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to 
relief . . . shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal 
extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . refused to license 
or use any rights to the patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)…. 
 
The trial court specifically addressed Scruggs’ antitrust claims under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act, applying both per se and rule of reason 
analyses. In its per se analysis, the court found that the 1996 Roundup 
restriction did not constitute per se illegal tying; Roundup was the only 
EPA-approved product for use over the top of the Roundup seeds from 
1996 to 1998, and only the licenses taken out during those years had the 
Roundup herbicide restriction. The court also found Monsanto’s grower 
incentive agreements to be legal restraints because they simply give 
growers an incentive to choose Roundup herbicide and do not coerce them 
into purchasing it. Next, the court found that Scruggs failed to demonstrate 
that Monsanto forced seed partners to buy Roundup in order to obtain a 
license. The court stated that if the seed partner agreements did amount to a 
tie, per se treatment was not appropriate. 
 
Under its rule of reason analysis, the trial court also found the evidence 
Scruggs presented with respect to the tying claims insufficient. Scruggs 
argued that Monsanto’s binding of dealers in downstream markets to the 
same restrictions it imposes on its seed partners (in a “third party clause”) 
was a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, as were the grower 
incentive agreements. The court found that the third party clause was a valid 
restriction because limited use licenses are valid, and the third party clause 
simply amounted to a limited use. Additionally, the court held that the 
grower incentive agreements were valid; the provisions were merely 
financial incentives and “d[id] not foreclose competition in a substantial 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                         Chap. 7, Page 23 
Hovenkamp                                                                                          Dec. 2012 
 
share of the relevant product market(s).” 
 
The trial court also found that: (1) Scruggs’ evidence was insufficient 
with respect to proving a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act for 
unlawful monopolization or attempted monopolization; (2) because there 
was no federal antitrust violation, the alleged state antitrust violations could 
also be dismissed on summary judgment; and (3) patent misuse was 
inapplicable because Monsanto did not use its patents to impermissibly 
broaden the scope of its patent grant. 
 
On appeal, Scruggs reasserts that the exclusivity provision, no replant 
policy, and technology fee payments required by Monsanto’s licensing 
agreements with seed growers are illegal anticompetitive practices. 
Monsanto has a right to exclude others from making, using, or selling its 
patented plant technology, see Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 29–30, and its no 
replant policy simply prevents purchasers of the seeds from using the 
patented biotechnology when that biotechnology makes a copy of itself. 
This restriction therefore is a valid exercise of its rights under the patent 
laws. Furthermore, Monsanto’s uniform technology fee is essentially a 
royalty fee, the charging of which is also within the scope of the patent 
grant. Lastly, the no research policy is a field of use restriction and is also 
within the protection of the patent laws…. 
 
Lastly, Scruggs asserts that the trial court’s decision should be sent back 
for a separate patent misuse analysis, because the burden of proving patent 
misuse is lower. However, patent misuse covers only activity falling outside 
of the patent grant, and Scruggs did not point to any activity falling outside 
Monsanto’s patent. 
 
DYK, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
… As a condition on the purchase of Roundup Ready seeds between 
1996 and 1998, Monsanto required that growers execute a licensing 
agreement containing the following (or similar) language. “You [the 
grower] agree: . . . [i]f a herbicide containing the same active ingredient as 
Roundup Ultra 
TM
 herbicide [glyphosate] (or one with a similar mode of 
action) is used over the top of Roundup Ready crops, you agree to use only 
Roundup® branded herbicide.” Scruggs claims that this provision 
unlawfully tied the sale of Roundup brand glyphosate herbicides to the sale 
of Roundup Ready seeds. 
 
The district court held, and Monsanto agrees, that the provision was 
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justified by the fact that Roundup was the only glyphosate herbicide 
approved by the EPA at that time for use “over the top” of crops. The 
district court concluded that “[b]ecause Roundup was the only product 
labeled for use ‘over-the-top’ of Roundup Ready crops between 1996 and 
1998, it was the only EPA-approved herbicide that could be used on 
Roundup Ready crops during that period[,]” and thus that the “defendants . . 
. failed to meet their burden of producing significant probative evidence that 
Monsanto forced farmers who wanted to purchase Roundup Ready seeds to 
purchase Roundup as well.” Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F.Supp.2d 568, 
577 (N.D.Miss.2004). The majority agrees. I read the Supreme Court cases 
as to the contrary. 
 
The Supreme Court has unequivocally held: “That a particular practice 
may be unlawful is not, in itself, a sufficient justification for collusion 
among competitors to prevent it.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465 (1986).
 
While the Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed this issue in the context of tying arrangements, I see no 
basis for applying a different rule or for justifying otherwise per se unlawful 
tying arrangements as designed to prevent illegal conduct. Monsanto urges 
that these cases are distinguishable because the competitors there sought to 
enforce state law, whereas here the tying arrangement is designed to enforce 
federal law. I see no basis for such a distinction. This is not a case in which 
federal law pervasively regulates, compels, or permits the allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct, which might create an implied antitrust immunity. 
See Billing v. Credit Suisse First Bos. Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 164–65 (2d 
Cir.2005). 
 
…. This is not a situation in which there were no commercially feasible 
alternatives. There was evidence that manufacturers produced products that 
could have been used “over the top,” and that all that was lacking was 
regulatory approval. In other words, Monsanto’s tying arrangements here 
did no more than enforce a regulatory requirement. Substantial competitive 
risks inhere in such an arrangement. Potential competitors are potentially 
discouraged from seeking regulatory approval or attempting to have the 
regulation modified or eliminated. To the extent that such efforts are 
discouraged, the proponent of the tie has succeeded in eliminating 
competition. 
 
Moreover, in this connection it is highly significant that Monsanto’s 
grower license agreements did not simply require the use of a government-
approved herbicide; they explicitly required the use of “Roundup branded 
herbicide.” A potential herbicide competitor thus would be concerned that, 
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even if it secured government approval of its product, use of the approved 
herbicide would still be barred under the contracts. The elimination of such 
potential competition is not permissible under the antitrust laws. 
 
The district court did not make a finding as to Monsanto’s market power 
in the alleged tying product….  I would vacate the judgment as to the 
alleged tie in the 1996–1998 grower agreements, and remand for the district 
court to determine whether the relevant contract provision in fact 
constituted patent misuse and, if misuse occurred, whether it was purged. 
See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 n. 10 (Fed.Cir.1986). 
 
NOTE 
 
In an amicus brief supporting Mitchell and Eddie Scruggs and the other 
defendants, the American Antitrust Institute argued that 
 
[t]he invention at issue in this case is not a plant or seed, 
but a genetic trait. Although the plants and seeds at issue 
here can be characterized as producing new generations each 
year, it is less clear that such a characterization is accurate 
for a genetic trait. The trait, after all, does not change from 
year to year, any more than it does within a generation as 
additional cells are produced. (If the trait at issue changed, it 
presumably would no longer be covered by Monsanto’s 
patent.) As a result, it is not clear that the “generational” 
dividing line on which Monsanto’s seed-saving restriction is 
based is a meaningful one that can be viewed as within the 
scope of its invention. 
 
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the repair–
reconstruction distinction in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342-343 (1991), is apt: 
 
[A]lthough there is no right to “rebuild” a 
patented combination, the entity “exists” 
notwithstanding the fact that destruction or 
impairment of one of its elements renders it 
inoperable; and that, accordingly, replacement 
of that worn-out essential part is permissible 
restoration of the machine to the original use 
for which it was bought. The Court explained 
that it is “the use of the whole” of the 
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combination which a purchaser buys, and that 
repair or replacement of the worn-out, 
damaged or destroyed part is but an exercise 
of the right “to give duration to that which he 
owns, or has a right to use as a whole.” 
 
With reference to this discussion, the patented genetic trait 
“exists” from cell generation to cell generation and from year 
to year notwithstanding the annual cycle of the plant’s 
reproduction.  To put it another way, Monsanto has imposed 
a plant-level restriction, rather than a gene-level restriction 
that would be within the scope of its patent. Monsanto’s 
genes are expressed in the reproduction of plant cells as the 
plant develops, and in the production of the enzyme that 
makes the plants Roundup Ready. They are not expressed in 
the act of replanting a seed, and as the replanted seeds grow 
they are not expressed in any way different from their 
expression in the first planting. . . . Monsanto’s practices are 
akin to an attempt by the patentee of a new kind of 
automobile engine to require that buyers of cars 
incorporating that engine buy new cars every year.  
 
Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute in Support 
of Defendants–Appellants Supporting Reversal on Certain Issues at 22–24, 
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (No. 0401532), 
2005 WL 3937333 (some citations and footnotes omitted). Is there anything 
wrong with this analogy? A leading biotech trade association responded: 
 
The crux of this argument . . . lies in the incorrect belief, 
held by both [the defendants] and amici, that because the 
’605 patent does not “cover” seed, the DNA sequence and 
seed must be distinct products. The argument fails because 
the claims of the ’605 patent can indeed “cover” seed. There 
can be no serious doubt that the claims of the ’605 patent 
drafted in the open-ended “comprising” language, can cover 
seed if that seed includes the patented DNA sequence. 
Simply put the preambles to the claims of the ’605 patent 
(which recite a chimeric gene, but which might also have 
recited a plant or a seed) are not, in this case, a proper basis 
for determining the existence of separate products. 
 
In fact, despite protests that the ’605 patent does not 
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“cover” seed, the appellants and amici have effectively 
recognized that Monsanto’s genetic invention, at least as a 
commercial matter, can only be embodied in seeds and 
plants. In their brief, appellants rely on the statement of their 
expert, Prof. Carstensen, that by “[dis]allowing the use of the 
saved seed on the farm, [Monsanto] forecloses the farmer’s 
freedom of choice as to the source of seed with that genetic 
trait.” Thus, appellants admit that a seed is required to obtain 
Monsanto’s patented technology in a commercially useful 
product. 
 
Briefs of the various amici curiae in this case also 
acknowledge that there is no demand for the patented DNA 
sequence without the germplasm. For example, the amicus 
State of Mississippi states that “[o]f course, farmers must 
buy first-generation seed in order to obtain the Roundup 
Ready technology.” In admitting that “farmers must buy 
first-generation seed,” the State of Mississippi recognizes 
that there is no separate product directed to the patented 
DNA sequences of the ’605 patent useful to farmers. 
Similarly, the amicus [American Antitrust Institute] admits 
that “[o]f course, most if not all farmers would purchase the 
unpatented seed components from a Monsanto seed partner 
in the first year in any event, because the farmers could not 
themselves incorporate Monsanto’s genetic technology in the 
seed.” Finally, amicus Center for Food Safety . . . notes that 
“farmers do not plant ‘plant cells’ or ‘chimeric genes.’” 
Once again, farmers would have no demand for, much less 
the ability to use, the patented DNA sequence of the ’605 
patent if it were not embodied in seed. 
 
Brief of Amicus Curiae, the Biotechnology Industry Organization, in 
Support of Plaintiff–Appellee Monsanto Company Supporting Affirmance 
on Certain Issues at 7–9, Monsanto Co., 459 F.3d 1328 (No. 04-1532), 2005 
WL 2477397 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 
PRINCO CORP. v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 
616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
 
BRYSON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case requires us to consider the scope of the doctrine of patent 
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misuse. Patent misuse developed as a nonstatutory defense to claims of 
patent infringement. In the licensing context, the doctrine limits a patentee’s 
right to impose conditions on a licensee that exceed the scope of the patent 
right. Because patent misuse is a judge-made doctrine that is in derogation 
of statutory patent rights against infringement, this court has not applied the 
doctrine of patent misuse expansively. In this case, we adhere to that 
approach, and we sustain the decision of the International Trade 
Commission that the doctrine of patent misuse does not bar the intervenor, 
U.S. Philips Corporation, from enforcing its patent rights against the 
appellants Princo Corporation and Princo America Corporation 
(collectively, “Princo”). 
 
This case has a lengthy history, which we will recite only in pertinent 
part. The technology at issue concerns two types of digital storage 
devices—recordable compact discs (“CD-Rs”) and rewritable compact discs 
(“CD-RWs”). Those devices were developed in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
companies that developed the CD-R/RW technology generated technical 
standards to ensure that discs made by different manufacturers would be 
compatible and playable on machines that were designed to read the earlier 
generation compact discs (“CDs”) and “read-only” compact discs (“CD-
ROMs”). The standards that were generated for CD-Rs and CD-RWs were 
collected in a publication entitled “Recordable CD Standard,” informally 
known as the “Orange Book.” The CD-R/RW technology was developed 
principally by Philips and Sony Corporation, working in collaboration. 
Philips and Sony also jointly developed the Orange Book standards. 
 
One aspect of the CD-R/RW technology—and the corresponding 
Orange Book standards—is at issue in this case. In the course of their work, 
the Sony and Philips engineers had to address the problem of how to encode 
position information in the disc so that a consumer’s CD reader/writer could 
maintain proper positioning while writing data to the disc. Philips and Sony 
proposed different solutions to that problem. Philips’s solution was to use 
an analog method of modulating the frequency of the “groove” on the disc 
so as to add location codes to the disc. One of Sony’s proposed solutions 
was to use a digital method to encode location codes into the disc groove. 
Philips’s approach was later set forth in two of the patents at issue in this 
case, referred to as the “Raaymakers patents.” Sony’s approach was set 
forth in one of its own patents, referred to as the “Lagadec patent.” 
 
After reviewing the competing solutions, the Sony and Philips engineers 
agreed that they would use the Raaymakers approach to solving the 
problem, not the Lagadec approach. The engineers from both companies 
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agreed that the Raaymakers approach “was simple and . . . worked very 
well.” By contrast, as the Commission found in the course of this litigation, 
the Lagadec approach was “prone to error” and would have been “very 
difficult” to implement. Philips and Sony therefore incorporated the 
Raaymakers approach in the Orange Book as the standard for 
manufacturing CD-R/RW discs. 
 
Philips and Sony sought to commercialize their technology by offering 
licenses to the patents that were required to manufacture CD-R/RW discs in 
accordance with the Orange Book standards. Administering the licensing 
program, Philips offered several different “package” licenses to the Philips 
and Sony patents (and those of several other patent holders). Philips 
included in the patent packages those patents that it regarded as potentially 
necessary to make Orange-Book-compliant CD-R or CD-RW discs, 
including the Raaymakers and Lagadec patents. The package licenses 
contained a “field of use” restriction, limiting the licensees to using the 
licensed patents to produce discs according to the Orange Book standards. 
After 2001, Philips offered additional package options, grouping the patents 
into two categories, denominated “essential” and “nonessential,” for 
producing compact discs that complied with the technology standards set 
forth in the Orange Book. 
 
In the late 1990s, Princo sought to manufacture discs and import them 
into this country, and it entered into a package license agreement with 
Philips. Soon after entering the agreement, however, Princo stopped paying 
the licensing fees required by the agreement. Philips then filed a complaint 
with the International Trade Commission, alleging that Princo (along with 
several other parties) was violating section 337(a)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act of 
1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B), by importing CD-Rs and CD-RWs that 
infringed Philips’s patents. 
 
In the course of proceedings before an administrative law judge, Princo 
raised the affirmative defense of patent misuse. Among other arguments, 
Princo contended that Philips had improperly forced Princo and other 
licensees, as a condition of licensing patents that were necessary to 
manufacture CD-Rs or CD-RWs, to take licenses to other patents that were 
not necessary to manufacture those products. 
 
The administrative law judge agreed with Philips that Princo had 
infringed various claims of the six asserted Philips patents and that the 
patents were not invalid. However, the administrative law judge denied 
relief to Philips on the ground that the Philips patents were unenforceable 
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because of patent misuse. The administrative law judge found, inter alia, 
that the package licensing agreements offered by Philips constituted 
impermissible tying arrangements because they forced manufacturers to 
license extraneous patents in addition to the patents that the manufacturers 
wanted to license. That tying arrangement, according to the administrative 
law judge, rendered all of Philips’s patents in suit unenforceable. The 
administrative law judge also held Philips’s patents unenforceable based on 
price fixing, price discrimination, and restraint of trade. 
 
On Philips’s petition for review, the Commission affirmed the 
administrative law judge’s ruling that Philips’s package licensing practice 
constituted patent misuse for unlawfully tying patents that were essential for 
the Orange Book standard to licenses for other patents that were not 
essential. That practice was improper, according to the Commission, 
because it forced licensees to purchase licenses to patents that they did not 
want or need, and it did not allow them the option of licensing individual 
patents. The Commission did not address the administrative judge’s ruling 
that the patent pooling arrangements between Philips and its co-licensors, 
including Sony, constituted price fixing and price discrimination, or the 
administrative judge’s ruling that the royalty structure of the patent pools 
resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
 
Philips appealed to this court, and we reversed. U.S. Philips Corp. v. 
Int’l Trade Comm’n (Philips I), 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed.Cir.2005). We rejected 
the Commission’s theory that Philips’s package licensing practice 
constituted patent misuse by improperly tying nonessential patents to 
essential ones. We explained that Philips gave its licensees the option of 
using any of the patents in the package at the licensee’s option, and that 
Philips charged a uniform fee to permit the manufacture of discs covered by 
the patented technology regardless of which patents the licensee used in its 
manufacturing process. Philips did not require the licensee to use any 
particular technology in any of the patents, including the patents that Princo 
complained were “nonessential.” In effect, we concluded, Philips was 
simply charging a fixed licensing fee for licensees to manufacture discs 
under the Orange Book standard. We noted that including additional patents 
in the package was the functional equivalent of promising not to sue 
licensees on any of the patents in the group, which had the advantages of 
minimizing transaction costs and ensuring against the risk of post-
agreement disputes as to whether those additional patents were required to 
practice the patented technology. 
 
We also reversed the Commission’s ruling that Philips had engaged in 
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patent misuse under the rule of reason. As to that issue, we held that the 
Commission’s conclusion that Philips’s patent package licensing program 
was anticompetitive was predicated on legal errors and on factual findings 
that were not supported by substantial evidence. We remanded the case to 
the Commission for further proceedings because the Commission had not 
addressed all the grounds on which the administrative law judge had based 
his ruling. 
 
On remand, the Commission rejected Princo’s remaining theories of 
patent misuse. The Commission first rejected Princo’s argument that Philips 
committed patent misuse by combining with its horizontal competitors to 
fix the price of patent licenses in the relevant market, i.e., the market for 
licensing CD-R/RW patents. The Commission found that there was no 
evidence in the record that the patents in the joint package licenses covered 
technologies that were close substitutes, or that the pool licensors would 
have competed in the technology licensing market absent the pooling 
arrangements. Consequently, the Commission found that the joint package 
licenses had not been shown to constitute horizontal price fixing. 
 
In particular, the Commission rejected Princo’s argument that Sony’s 
Lagadec patent should not have been included in the patent packages. The 
Commission noted Philips’s contention that claim 6 of the Lagadec patent 
covered a portion of the Orange Book standard and therefore was 
technically a “blocking patent.” The Commission explained that if Philips 
was correct that Lagadec was a necessary part of the Orange Book patent 
package, then “no misuse flows from including the [Lagadec] patent in the 
joint licenses.” Even if a license to the Lagadec patent was not necessary to 
manufacture Orange-Book-compliant discs, the Commission stated, there 
was no merit to Princo’s theories of patent misuse based on the Lagadec 
patent, because “there has been no showing that the Lagadec . . . patent 
competes with another patent in the pool, no showing that the pool licensors 
would have competed in the technology licensing market absent the pooling 
arrangement, and no showing of the anticompetitive effect required under a 
rule of reason analysis.” 
 
After an extensive analysis of the evidence presented to the 
administrative law judge, the Commission concluded that the record “does 
not support a finding that the Lagadec ′565 patent competes with the 
[Raaymakers] patents,” and that Princo “failed to identify evidence 
demonstrating that, absent the pooling arrangements, the pool licensors 
would have competed in the technology licensing market.” The 
Commission noted that the administrative law judge had found that 
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testimony at the hearing indicated that the Lagadec patent “constitutes 
completely different technology that does not work well according to the 
Orange Book standards” and that Lagadec was therefore “extraneous to the 
Orange Book.” In particular, the administrative law judge had found that 
Lagadec constituted “at best, a substitute technology” that could not be used 
to manufacture Orange-Book-compliant discs, and “at worst, an extraneous, 
nonworking add-on to the patent pool.” Under those circumstances, the 
Commission explained, licensees who wished to make Orange-Book-
compliant discs were, at most, required to accept something they did not 
want and would not otherwise have sought to obtain from other sellers. 
 
With respect to the contention that including the Lagadec patent in the 
license packages enabled Philips to secure Sony’s adherence to the Orange 
Book standards and thereby foreclose competition, the Commission found 
that theory speculative and unsupported by the evidence in the record. 
Because there was no evidence that Sony would have entered the CD-R/RW 
market with a system based on the Lagadec technology and no evidence 
that such a system would have become a significant competitive force in 
that market, the Commission held that theory insufficient to support a 
finding of patent misuse. 
 
On Princo’s appeal, a divided panel of this court ruled against the 
Commission and Philips. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 563 F.3d 
1301 (Fed.Cir.2009). Although the panel rejected several of Princo’s 
arguments, it vacated the Commission’s remedial orders and remanded the 
case for further proceedings on one issue. 
 
At the outset, the panel unanimously rejected Princo’s argument that 
Philips had engaged in patent misuse through improper “tying” by including 
the Lagadec patent in the Orange Book license packages. The court noted 
that while grouping patents together in package licenses has anticompetitive 
potential, it “also has potential to create substantial procompetitive 
efficiencies” such as clearing possible blocking patents, integrating 
complementary technology, and avoiding litigation. 563 F.3d at 1308. The 
court explained that the inclusion in a package license of the patents that are 
necessary to enable the practice of the particular technology “is not tying of 
the type that patent misuse doctrine seeks to prevent.” Id. Because the court 
concluded that it would have been reasonable for a manufacturer to believe 
that a license under the Lagadec patent was necessary to practice the Orange 
Book technology, and because “one of the major potential efficiencies of 
package licensing in the context of innovative technology is the avoidance 
of ‘uncertainty that could only be resolved through expensive litigation,’ ” 
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the court ruled that the “inclusion of the Lagadec patent in the patent pool 
did not give rise to an illegal tying arrangement.” 
 
The panel also unanimously rejected Princo’s argument that Philips had 
violated the principle of Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 
395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969), that “conditioning the grant of a patent license 
upon payment of royalties on products which do not use the teaching of the 
patent [is] misuse.” Because, at the time the package licenses were 
executed, “it appeared that Lagadec reasonably might be necessary to 
manufacture Orange Book compact discs,” the panel concluded that “it 
cannot fairly be said on these facts that a royalty is paid on products which 
do not use the teaching of the Lagadec patent.” . . . 
 
In our cases applying the Supreme Court’s patent misuse decisions, we 
have characterized patent misuse as the patentee’s act of “impermissibly 
broaden [ing] the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with 
anticompetitive effect.” Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 
1001 (Fed.Cir.1986). When the patentee has used restrictive conditions on 
licenses or sales to broaden the scope of the patent grant, we have held that 
an accused infringer may invoke the doctrine of patent misuse to defeat the 
patentee’s claim…. 
 
In determining whether a particular licensing condition has the effect of 
impermissibly broadening the patent grant, courts have noted that the 
patentee begins with substantial rights under the patent grant—“includ[ing] 
the right to suppress the invention while continuing to prevent all others 
from using it, to license others, or to refuse to license, . . . to charge such 
royalty as the leverage of the patent monopoly permits,” and to limit the 
scope of the license to a particular “field of use.” United States v. 
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127, 1133 
(D.C.Cir.1981). Given that the patent grant entitles the patentee to impose a 
broad range of conditions in licensing the right to practice the patent, the 
doctrine of patent misuse “has largely been confined to a handful of specific 
practices by which the patentee seemed to be trying to ‘extend’ his patent 
grant beyond its statutory limits.” USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 
505, 510 (7th Cir.1982). 
 
Recognizing the narrow scope of the doctrine, we have emphasized that 
the defense of patent misuse is not available to a presumptive infringer 
simply because a patentee engages in some kind of wrongful commercial 
conduct, even conduct that may have anticompetitive effects. See C.R. 
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1373 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“Although 
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the defense of patent misuse . . . evolved to protect against ‘wrongful’ use 
of patents, the catalog of practices labeled ‘patent misuse’ does not include 
a general notion of ‘wrongful’ use.”). Other courts have expressed the same 
view. See Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 
84–85 (6th Cir.1971) (There is no such thing as “misuse in the air. The 
misuse must be of the patent in suit. An antitrust offense does not 
necessarily amount to misuse merely because it involves patented products 
or products which are the subject of a patented process.” (citations 
omitted)); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230, 238–
39 (10th Cir.1968) (the defense of patent misuse has been allowed “only 
where there had been a misuse of the patent in suit”). While proof of an 
antitrust violation shows that the patentee has committed wrongful conduct 
having anticompetitive effects, that does not establish misuse of the patent 
in suit unless the conduct in question restricts the use of that patent and does 
so in one of the specific ways that have been held to be outside the 
otherwise broad scope of the patent grant. 
 
Although patent misuse has been mainly a judicially created defense, 
Congress has not been entirely silent about the doctrine. However, instead 
of saying what patent misuse is, Congress has said what it is not. Thus, 
section 271(d) of the Patent Act sets forth five types of conduct that may 
not provide the basis for finding “misuse or illegal extension of the patent 
right.” The last two of the five, which were added in 1988, are 
 
(4) refus[ing] to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) 
condition [ing] the license of any rights to the patent or the 
sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to 
rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, 
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has 
market power in the relevant market for the patent or 
patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(d). 
 
Importantly, Congress enacted section 271(d) not to broaden the 
doctrine of patent misuse, but to cabin it. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm 
& Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 201 (1980)…. 
 
The dissent argues that the 1988 amendment to section 271(d) makes it 
“quite clear that Congress intended that the patent misuse doctrine could 
extend to a refusal to license patented technologies by parties acting in 
concert.” That, however, is not how we interpret the statute or its legislative 
history. The statute itself contains no mention of concerted action. In the 
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legislative history, Representative Kastenmeier described various licensing 
provisions that had been held to constitute patent misuse, including price 
fixing, covenants not to compete, resale price maintenance, and grantback 
licenses. 134 Cong. Rec. 32,295 (1988). The dissent points to the inclusion 
of “covenants not to compete” in Representative Kastenmeier’s list, and 
interprets that statement as an endorsement of the proposition that a 
concerted refusal to license a patent constitutes patent misuse. But 
Representative Kastenmeier described the listed practices as “patent 
licensing arrangements.” Moreover, his catalog of unlawful practices 
corresponded to the list of proscribed practices set forth in the House bill, 
the “Patent Licensing Reform Act of 1988,” to which he alluded in his 
remarks.. Each of the prohibited practices listed in that bill was a condition 
on granting licenses, including the imposition of “covenants not to 
compete.” 134 Cong. Rec. 3261 (1988) (statement of Rep. Robert 
Kastenmeier); H.R. 4086, 100th Cong. (1988) (“unreasonably imposing as a 
condition of granting a license for a patent that the licensee may not 
produce or sell competing goods.”). From the context, it is clear that 
Representative Kastenmeier’s reference to “covenants not to compete” on 
which the dissent relies was an allusion to non-compete clauses in patent 
licenses, not to concerted refusals to license among horizontal competitors. 
Nor is there anything else in the legislative history that supports the 
dissent’s interpretation of Congress’s intent. 
 
Section 271(d) is not directly implicated in this case because the 
conduct here at issue does not fall within any of the five statutorily defined 
categories. Nonetheless, the statute is pertinent because, as both the text and 
the legislative history of the 1988 amendment to section 271(d) make clear, 
Congress was concerned about the open-ended scope of the doctrine and 
sought to confine it to anticompetitive conduct by patentees who leverage 
their patents to obtain economic advantages outside the legitimate scope of 
the patent grant. 
 
This case presents a completely different scenario from the cases 
previously identified by the Supreme Court and by this court as implicating 
the doctrine of patent misuse. Philips is not imposing restrictive conditions 
on the use of the Raaymakers patents to enlarge the physical or temporal 
scope of those patents. Instead, the alleged act of patent misuse that the 
panel focused on was the claimed horizontal agreement between Philips and 
Sony to restrict the availability of the Lagadec patent—an entirely different 
patent that was never asserted in the infringement action against Princo. 
Even if such an agreement were shown to exist, and even if it were shown 
to have anticompetitive effects, a horizontal agreement restricting the 
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availability of Sony’s Lagadec patent would not constitute misuse of 
Philips’s Raaymakers patents or any of Philips’s other patents in suit. 
 
Reduced to its simplest elements, the question in this case comes down 
to this: When a patentee offers to license a patent, does the patentee misuse 
that patent by inducing a third party not to license its separate, competitive 
technology? Princo has not pointed to any authority suggesting that such a 
scenario constitutes patent misuse, and nothing in the policy underlying the 
judge-made doctrine of patent misuse would support such a result. Such an 
agreement would not have the effect of increasing the physical or temporal 
scope of the patent in suit, and it therefore would not fall within the 
rationale of the patent misuse doctrine as explicated by the Supreme Court 
and this court. 
 
What patent misuse is about, in short, is “patent leverage,” i.e., the use 
of the patent power to impose overbroad conditions on the use of the patent 
in suit that are “not within the reach of the monopoly granted by the 
Government.” Zenith, 395 U.S. at 136–38. What that requires, at minimum, 
is that the patent in suit must “itself significantly contribute[] to the practice 
under attack.” Kolene Corp., 440 F.2d at 85. Patent misuse will not be 
found when there is “no connection” between the patent right and the 
misconduct in question, see Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 
319 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir.1963), or no “use” of the patent, see Virginia 
Panel, 133 F.3d at 870. In this case, there is no such link between the 
putative misconduct and the Raaymakers patents. 
 
Princo makes several arguments in its effort to bring this case within the 
scope of the traditional patent misuse doctrine. First, Princo contends that 
Philips “leveraged” its patents, as that term has been used in patent misuse 
cases, because it used the proceeds of its highly successful licensing 
program to fund royalty payments to Sony and because those payments 
gave Sony the incentive to enter into the alleged agreement to suppress the 
Lagadec patent. However, the use of funds from a lawful licensing program 
to support other, anticompetitive behavior is not the kind of “leveraging” 
that the Supreme Court and this court have referred to in discussing the 
leveraging of a patent that constitutes patent misuse. See C.R. Bard, 157 
F.3d at 1373 (“Although the law should not condone wrongful commercial 
activity, the body of misuse law and precedent need not be enlarged into an 
open-ended pitfall for patent-supported commerce.”). Even if such use of 
funds were to be deemed misconduct, it does not place any conditions on 
the availability of Philips’s patents to any potential licensees, so it is not the 
power of Philips’s patent right that is being misused. 
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Princo also argues that the Supreme Court has not required conventional 
“leveraging” of a patent in order to establish patent misuse. For that 
proposition, however, Princo relies on antitrust cases in which the Court 
stated that a patentee is not immunized against an antitrust violation by the 
privilege of a patent; those cases did not involve patent misuse or the 
enforceability of the defendants’ patents. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum 
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 396–400 (1948) (finding unlawful price fixing and 
control of distribution of gypsum board); Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United 
States, 283 U.S. 163, 174 (1931) (“[T]he limited monopolies granted to 
patent owners do not exempt them from the prohibitions of the Sherman 
Act.”). That is a different issue altogether from the issue before us, which is 
whether an infringing party can obtain immunity against a valid charge of 
patent infringement by showing an unrelated antitrust violation. Although 
the Lagadec patent and the Raaymakers patents were all included together 
in the Orange Book package licenses offered by Philips, those package 
licenses are independent of the antitrust violation that is now being alleged, 
i.e., a separate agreement between Philips and Sony to suppress the 
availability of the Lagadec technology. 
 
In theory, the reason an agreement with Sony has value to Philips is 
because suppressing potential competition with the Raaymakers technology 
makes the Philips licenses more valuable. But that value does not derive 
from the fact that Sony is a co-licensor with Philips or the fact that the 
Lagadec patent is included in the package licenses. If the Lagadec patent 
were owned by an independent third party and not included in the Philips–
Sony package licenses at all, an agreement between Philips and the third 
party to suppress the Lagadec technology would have exactly the same 
economic impact on Philips and Princo as the hypothesized agreement with 
Sony. That agreement might be vulnerable to challenge under the antitrust 
laws, but it could not reasonably be characterized as misuse of the 
Raaymakers patents. Thus, it does not follow from the possible existence of 
an antitrust violation with respect to Sony’s Lagadec patent that Philips is 
guilty of patent misuse with respect to the Raaymakers patents. 
 
… At bottom, Princo’s complaint is not that its license to the 
Raaymakers patents is unreasonably conditioned, but that the Lagadec 
patent has not been made available for non-Orange-Book uses. And that is 
not patent misuse under any court’s definition of the term. 
 
The purported agreement between Philips and Sony has none of the 
features that courts have characterized as constituting patent misuse. In 
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particular, it does not leverage the power of a patent to exact concessions 
from a licensee that are not fairly within the ambit of the patent right. 
Although the dissent contends that using the leverage of a patent against 
licensees is not a necessary component of patent misuse, every one of the 
“patent misuse” cases cited by the dissent for that proposition have that very 
fact pattern (except for the Compton case, discussed above, in which the 
patentee agreed to place restrictions on his own right to compete). If the 
purported agreement between Philips and Sony not to license the Lagadec 
technology is unlawful, that can only be under antitrust law, not patent 
misuse law; nothing about that agreement, if it exists, constitutes an 
exploitation of the Raaymakers patents against Philips’s licensees…. 
 
 
In sum, this is not a case in which conditions have been placed in patent 
licenses to require licensees to agree to anticompetitive terms going beyond 
the scope of the patent grant. Rather, in this case the assertion of misuse 
arises not from the terms of the license itself but rather from an alleged 
collateral agreement between Sony and Philips. In that setting, the doctrine 
of patent misuse does not immunize Princo against the legal effect of its 
acts of infringement. 
 
Apart from Princo’s failure to show that Philips unlawfully leveraged its 
Raaymakers patents, a finding of patent misuse is unwarranted in this case 
because Princo failed to establish that the alleged agreement to suppress the 
Lagadec technology had anticompetitive effects. Whether viewed as a 
matter of patent misuse or in light of general antitrust principles, Princo’s 
claim regarding the alleged agreement fails because Philips and Sony acted 
legitimately in choosing not to compete against their own joint venture. 
Princo also failed to show that the asserted agreement had any 
anticompetitive effects because, as the Commission found, the Lagadec 
technology was not a viable potential competitor to the technology 
embodied in the Raaymakers patents. 
 
At the outset, Princo urges us to overrule the line of authority in this 
court holding that patent misuse requires a showing that the patentee’s 
conduct had anticompetitive effects. We decline to do so. This court has 
observed that “[t]o sustain a misuse defense involving a licensing 
arrangement not held to have been per se anticompetitive by the Supreme 
Court, a factual determination must reveal that the overall effect of the 
license tends to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined 
relevant market.” Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001–02. We have consistently 
adhered to that requirement. Our position is consistent with the traditional 
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characterization of the defense of patent misuse by the Supreme Court, see 
Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 38 (describing the patent misuse doctrine as 
applying “when a patentee uses its patent ‘as the effective means of 
restraining competition with its sale of an unpatented article’ ”)…. 
 
 Turning from patent misuse law to antitrust principles, Princo contends 
that the hypothesized agreement between Philips and Sony not to license the 
Lagadec technology for non-Orange-Book purposes was a naked restraint of 
trade with no procompetitive justification, and that Philips’s conduct in 
entering into that agreement should render its Orange Book patents 
unenforceable. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree. 
 
Although joint ventures can be used to facilitate collusion among 
competitors and are therefore subject to antitrust scrutiny, see NCAA v. Bd. 
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984), research joint 
ventures such as the one between Philips and Sony can have significant 
procompetitive features, and it is now well settled that an agreement among 
joint venturers to pool their research efforts is analyzed under the rule of 
reason. See Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 52 
(1st Cir.1998) (Joint venture research enterprises, “unless they amount to 
complete shams, are rarely susceptible to per se treatment. Where the 
venture is producing a new product . . . there is patently a potential for a 
productive contribution to the economy, and conduct that is strictly 
ancillary to this productive effort . . . is evaluated under the rule of 
reason.”).. . . 
 
Collaboration for the purpose of developing and commercializing new 
technology can result in economies of scale and integrations of 
complementary capacities that reduce costs, facilitate innovation, eliminate 
duplication of effort and assets, and share risks that no individual member 
would be willing to undertake alone, thereby “promot[ing] rather than 
hinder[ing] competition.” Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property §§ 5.1, at 24; 5.5, at 28 (Apr. 6, 
1995); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2115a, at 110 (“[J]oint 
innovation often produces significant social benefits in relation to costs.”); 
FTC & Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among 
Competitors § 2.1, at 6 (Apr.2000); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust 
Analysis of Joint Ventures After the Supreme Court’s Dagher Decision, 57 
Emory L.J. 735, 767–68 (2008); Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of 
Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the Rewards of 
Innovation, 61 Antitrust L.J. 937, 938 (1993). 
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In particular, as we explained in Philips I, research joint ventures that 
seek to develop industry-wide standards for new technology can have 
decidedly procompetitive effects. The absence of standards for new 
technology can easily result in a “Tower of Babel” effect that increases 
costs, reduces utility, and frustrates consumers. As a leading treatise has 
noted, cooperation by competitors in standard-setting “can provide 
procompetitive benefits the market would not otherwise provide, by 
allowing a number of different firms to produce and market competing 
products compatible with a single standard.” Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP 
& Antitrust § 35.2b (2010). Those benefits include greater product 
interoperability, including the promotion of price competition among 
interoperable products; positive network effects, including an increase in 
the value of products as interoperable products become more widely used; 
and incentives to innovate by establishing a technical baseline for further 
product improvements. See Patrick D. Curran, Comment, Standard-Setting 
Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality, 70 U. Chi. L.Rev. 
983, 985–90 (2003). Congress has recognized those procompetitive features 
and has directed that the activities of a “standards development organization 
while engaged in a standards development activity” is subject to the rule of 
reason. See Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 
2004, Pub.L. No. 108-237 § 104, 118 Stat. 661, 663. 
 
The “ancillary restraints” that are often important to collaborative 
ventures, such as agreements between the collaborators not to compete 
against their joint venture, are also assessed under the rule of reason. See 
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 214, 
223–30 (D.C.Cir.1986) (unlike a naked horizontal restraint that does not 
accompany a contract integration, “an ancillary horizontal restraint, one that 
is part of an integration of the economic activities of the parties and appears 
capable of enhancing the group’s efficiency, is to be judged according to its 
purpose and effect”); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 
185, 189 (7th Cir.1985) (“A restraint is ancillary when it may contribute to 
the success of a cooperative venture that promises greater productivity and 
output.”); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 11 (1st 
Cir.1979) (agreement that “neither of the parties to the joint venture will 
compete with it” is “not offensive in and of itself”); United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir.1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 
211 (1899) (“Restrictions in the articles of partnership upon the business 
activity of the members, with a view of securing their entire effort in the 
common enterprise were, of course, only ancillary to the main end of the 
union, and were to be encouraged.”); Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2115b1, 
at 113 (agreements between firms engaged in joint innovation not to 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                         Chap. 7, Page 41 
Hovenkamp                                                                                          Dec. 2012 
 
innovate in the same area outside the context of the joint venture “are to be 
regarded as ancillary rather than naked restraints and are thus subject to the 
usual proof of power and anticompetitive effects”). Moreover, those 
ancillary restraints are not viewed in isolation, but in the context of the joint 
venture or other collaborative effort. Thus, agreements not to compete that 
might be suspect standing alone are regarded as reasonable when they are 
ancillary to “a larger endeavor whose success they promote.” Polk Bros., 
776 F.2d at 189. 
 
Princo does not contend that the selection of the Raaymakers 
technology, rather than the Lagadec technology, for the Orange Book 
standard was a violation of the public policy in favor of free competition, 
nor did the panel so find. Instead, the panel focused on whether Sony and 
Philips agreed to suppress competition between the technology represented 
by the Orange Book standard and technology that fell outside the Orange 
Book standard, i.e., the Lagadec digital encoding technology. The 
Commission did not answer that question because the question was never 
squarely presented to it. Nor do we need to decide whether there was any 
such agreement between Sony and Philips. That is because the 
Commission’s factual findings make it clear that even if there was such an 
agreement, it did not have the effect of suppressing potentially viable 
technology that could have competed with the Orange Book standards. 
 
The Commission found that “there has been no showing that the 
Lagadec ′565 patent competes with another patent in the pool, no showing 
that the pool licensors would have competed in the technology licensing 
market absent the pooling arrangement, and no showing of the anti-
competitive effect required under a rule of reason analysis.” The 
Commission supported that general finding with a series of specific findings 
based on the record before it. 
 
First, the Commission noted that the evidence before the administrative 
law judge showed that the Lagadec technology “does not work well 
according to the Orange Book standards.” The Commission added that the 
administrative law judge “credited testimony that the Lagadec approach is 
prone to errors and ‘did not provide a scheme that would work and was 
reliable.’ ” Those findings were not limited to the unsuitability of using 
Lagadec to produce Orange-Book-compliant discs, as Princo argues. 
Instead, as is clear from the testimony on which those findings were based, 
the findings applied more generally to the technical problems presented by 
the Lagadec technology. The administrative law judge referred to testimony 
by Philips’s expert explaining that there is “a real problem” with the 
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Lagadec digital approach and that “it is very difficult to carry out a 
decoding of this particular approach.” The expert added that “[a]s a result, 
Philips and Sony dismissed the Lagadec approach because this is a very 
difficult problem to solve and Lagadec just did not provide a scheme that 
would work and was reliable. . . . [F]rom basic physics, you can just see that 
this is not a good solution, and it really wouldn’t work well.” 
 
The Commission also noted that Princo had not pointed to any evidence 
“that the Lagadec approach is a commercially viable technological 
alternative to the technology of [the Raaymakers patents].” By way of 
explanation, the Commission commented that “the commercial viability of 
a method that is prone to errors, unreliable, and unworkable is doubtful.” 
Based on the Commission’s use of the term “commercial viability,” Princo 
argues that the Commission used the wrong standard in evaluating the 
Lagadec technology. According to Princo, instead of addressing the 
commercial viability of that technology, the Commission should have 
limited its inquiry to whether Lagadec had “the technical potential to 
develop as a workable alternative.” The Commission, however, addressed 
both technical feasibility and commercial potential, and it found the 
Lagadec approach lacking in both respects. 
 
Second, the Commission rejected the argument that Philips “included 
Sony in the [patent] pool not because Sony brought anything necessary to 
the CD-R/RW technology, but rather because Sony is a major player in the 
industry, whose cooperation Philips wanted.” The Commission found that 
assertion to be baseless and contrary to the testimony of several witnesses 
that Philips “partnered with Sony for technical reasons.” Thus, although 
Princo argues at length that the pooling arrangement was not designed as a 
joint technical project between Philips and Sony, but rather as a means of 
allowing Philips to share its royalties with Sony in exchange for Sony’s 
agreement not to compete against the Orange Book standard, the 
Commission found to the contrary. 
 
Finally, with respect to Princo’s related argument that including the 
Lagadec patent in the package licenses enabled Philips to avoid competition 
from non-Orange-book discs, the Commission stated that Princo had “not 
identified evidence establishing that, if Sony’s [Lagadec patent] were not 
included in the licenses, Sony likely would have developed technologies 
that competed against the Orange Book standard in a relevant market.” The 
Commission added that there was no evidence in the record that Sony 
“would have entered and survived to become a significant competitive 
force” in the CD-R/RW market with the Lagadec technology or that, absent 
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the pooling arrangements, the pool licensors would have competed with the 
Orange Book technology. 
 
Likewise, there was no evidence that any potential licensee might 
develop the Lagadec technology to compete with the Orange Book discs. 
Princo did not show that any potential disc manufacturer had ever been 
refused a license to the Lagadec patent for purposes of producing non-
Orange-Book discs, or had even sought to explore that possibility. Nor has 
Princo pointed to any evidence that the Lagadec patent was anything more 
than a theoretical solution, or that the unavailability of a separate license to 
Lagadec for non-Orange-Book purposes resulted in some realistic 
foreclosure of competition. 
 
While the suppression of nascent threats can be construed as 
anticompetitive behavior under certain circumstances, see United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C.Cir.2001) (en banc), Princo had the 
burden of showing that the hypothesized agreement had an actual adverse 
effect on competition in the relevant market. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 
526 U.S. 756, 775 n. 12 (1999); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2008) (noting that an antitrust plaintiff 
bears the initial burden of showing an actual adverse effect on competition); 
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1507c (antitrust 
plaintiff must introduce evidence that defendants “have restrained trade 
significantly” and have “impair[ed] competition” in a relevant market). 
 
What Princo had to demonstrate was that there was a “reasonable 
probability” that the Lagadec technology, if available for licensing, would 
have matured into a competitive force in the storage technology market. See 
United States v. Penn–Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 175-76 (1964) 
(requiring a finding that there was a reasonable probability that the 
competing companies would have “entered the market” or “remained a 
significant potential competitor”). It was not enough that there was some 
speculative possibility that Lagadec could have overcome the barriers to its 
technical feasibility and commercial success and become the basis for 
competing disc technology. The Commission found that Princo failed to 
show that the Lagadec technology had technical or commercial prospects 
that could enable it to compete with the Orange Book technology. Those 
findings wholly undermine Princo’s contention that this is a case in which 
the patents in suit have been used as part of an overall horizontal agreement 
with the effect of keeping a viable competitor out of the relevant market…. 
 
In sum, Princo has failed to show that the putative agreement between 
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Sony and Philips not to license the Lagadec technology for non-Orange-
Book purposes had any market effect at all—actual or prospective. The 
record, and the findings of the Commission, make clear that the Lagadec 
technology lacked both the technical and the commercial prospects that 
would have made it a possible basis for a product that could compete with 
Orange-Book-compliant discs in the data storage market. For that reason, 
Princo failed to demonstrate that any agreement not to license Lagadec 
would have had the anticompetitive effects necessary to condemn that 
agreement under rule-of-reason analysis. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that even if Philips and Sony engaged in an 
agreement not to license the Lagadec patent for non-Orange-Book purposes, 
that hypothesized agreement had no bearing on the physical or temporal 
scope of the patents in suit, nor did it have anticompetitive effects in the 
relevant market. The asserted agreement between Philips and Sony 
therefore did not constitute patent misuse and cannot justify rendering all of 
Philips’s Orange Book patents unenforceable. 
 
AFFIRMED 
 
[Concurring and dissenting opinions omitted.] 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Unilateral refusals to license IP rights—like unilateral refusals to deal 
generally—almost never violate antitrust laws. Concerted refusals to deal, 
on the other hand, are treated harshly. While the Patent Act explicitly states 
that a unilateral refusal to license a patent cannot constitute misuse, it 
doesn’t clearly give concerted refusals to license the same protection—nor, 
however, does the statute explicitly condemn them as misuse. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(d)(4)(2006). In a dissenting opinion Judge Dyk argued that it “would 
be absurd to assume that Congress intended to provide that the use of a 
patent that merited punishment as a felony [under the Sherman Act] would 
not constitute ‘misuse.’”  
   
A concerted refusal to license a plant or other input can facilitate 
collusion by denying resources to rivals unless they can find other sources. 
A concerted refusal to license an unused patent can go much further. Not 
only does it deny rivals that particular technology but it also prevents them 
from developing any technology independently that would infringe one or 
more of that patent’s claims. Someone wishing to develop a digital 
alternative to the analog technology licensed in the Sony/Philips package 
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would have to invent around the Lagadec patent claims even though the 
technology claimed in that patent is not in use. 
 
Further, this licensing rule would not distinguish between internally 
developed patents and those acquired from the outside. A group of firms 
employing a particular technology could purchase exclusive rights in 
patents developed by a nascent rival and agree not to assign them to anyone 
else, thus protecting their own technology from competitive entry. The 
Princo majority and dissent debated whether Congress intended section 
271(d)(4) to cover concerted as well as unilateral refusals, but the legislative 
history is very thin, producing only a debate over whether noncompetition 
agreements in patent licenses amounted to concerted refusals. They should 
have looked at the status of antitrust law on the issue, however, which made 
unilateral refusals to license virtually lawful per se while often condemning 
concerted refusals. 
 
Of course, not every concerted refusal to license should be unlawful per 
se. They are appropriately covered by the ancillary restraints doctrine. 
Naked agreements not to license are unlawful per se, while refusals 
reasonably necessary to further joint research or production would be 
unlawful only if market power and anticompetitive effects were proven. By 
contrast, reading section 271(d) to authorize naked concerted refusals is 
likely to harm both competition and the incentive to innovate.  See Christina 
Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Concerted Refusals to License 
Intellectual Property Rights, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 21, 22–24 (2011).  
 
2. As of late 2011, no court has relied on the majority’s conclusion that 
a concerted refusal to license a patent does not constitute misuse. But patent 
holders are relying on Princo to argue against “expansion of patent misuse 
beyond existing precedent.” Brief of Plaintiff–Appellee Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals Corporation at 36, Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Mylan Pharm. 
Inc., No. 2011-1203, (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2011), 2011 WL 2323813; see also 
Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Their Renewed Motion to Strike the Teva 
and Sun Defendants’ Patent Misuse and Unclean Hands Defenses at 2, 
Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 04-2355 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 
2010), 2010 WL 4806209 (“[A]s the Federal Circuit has said and recently 
reinforced, allegations of anticompetitive conduct generally related to a 
patent or a patented product are insufficient to state a misuse claim. . . . 
[A]n affirmative defense of patent misuse must allege ‘“patent leverage,” 
i.e., the use of the patent power to impose overbroad conditions on the use 
of the patent in suit that are not within the reach of the [patent] monopoly’ 
and which have an anticompetitive effect.”). Commentators seem to agree 
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with these patent holders. See, e.g., Richard Li-dar Wang, Deviated, 
Unsound, and Self-Retreating: A Critical Assessment of Princo v. ITC En 
Banc Decision, 16 Marquette Intell. Prop. L. Rev. ( Jan. 2012) (stating that 
Princo “arguably reduce[s] the misuse scope even narrower than antitrust”); 
Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2010: Patent and Trademark Cases, 9 Nw. J. 
Tech. & Intell. Prop. 312, 317 (2011); Timothy J. Barron & Olivia T. Luk, 
The Patent Misuse Defense After Princo, Intell. Prop. Litig., Winter 2011; 
Phillip W. Goter, Note, Princo, Patent Pools, and the Risk of Foreclosure: 
A Framework for Assessing Misuse, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 699, 723 (2011).  
 
BRULOTTE v. THYS CO. 
379 U.S. 29 (1964) 
 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
Respondent, owner of various patents for hop-picking, sold a machine 
to each of the petitioners for a flat sum and issued a license for its use. 
Under that license there is payable a minimum royalty of $500 for each 
hop-picking season or $3.33
1
/3 per 200 pounds of dried hops harvested by 
the machine, whichever is greater. The licenses by their terms may not be 
assigned nor may the machines be removed from Yakima County. The 
licenses issued to petitioners listed 12 patents relating to hop-picking 
machines; but only seven were incorporated into the machines sold to and 
licensed for use by petitioners. Of those seven all expired on or before 1957. 
But the licenses issued by respondent to them continued for terms beyond 
that date. 
 
Petitioners refused to make royalty payments accruing both before and 
after the expiration of the patents. This suit followed. One defense was 
misuse of the patents through extension of the license agreements beyond 
the expiration date of the patents. The trial court rendered judgment for 
respondent and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed. 62 Wash.2d 
284, 382 P.2d 271. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 
 
We conclude that the judgment below must be reversed insofar as it 
allows royalties to be collected which accrued after the last of the patents 
incorporated into the machines had expired. The Constitution by Art. I, § 8 
authorizes Congress to secure ‘for limited times’ to inventors ‘the exclusive 
right’ to their discoveries. Congress exercised that power by 35 U.S.C. s 
154 which provides in part as follows: 
 
‘Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention 
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and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term 
of seventeen years, of the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States, referring to the specification for the particulars 
thereof. . . .’ 
 
The right to make, the right to sell, and the right to use ‘may be granted 
or conferred separately by the patentee.’ Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall. 453, 456 
700. But these rights become public property once the 17-year period 
expires. As stated by Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the Court in Scott 
Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256: 
 
‘. . . any attempted reservation or continuation in the 
patentee or those claiming under him of the patent 
monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal device 
employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the 
patent laws.’ 
 
The Supreme Court of Washington held that in the present case the 
period during which royalties were required was only ‘a reasonable amount 
of time over which to spread the payments for the use of the patent.’ But 
there is intrinsic evidence that the agreements were not designed with that 
limited view. As we have seen the purchase price in each case was a flat 
sum, the annual payments not being part of the purchase price but royalties 
for use of the machine during that year. The royalty payments due for the 
post-expiration period are by their terms for use during that period, and are 
not deferred payments for use during the pre-expiration period. Nor is the 
case like the hypothetical ones put to us where non-patented articles are 
marketed at prices based on use. The machines in issue here were patented 
articles and the royalties exacted were the same for the post-expiration 
period as they were for the period of the patent. That is peculiarly 
significant in this case in view of other provisions of the license agreements. 
The license agreements prevent assignment of the machines or their 
removal from Yakima County after, as well as before, the expiration of the 
patents.  
 
Those restrictions are apt and pertinent to protection of the patent 
monopoly; and their applicability to the post-expiration period is a telltale 
sign that the licensor was using the licenses to project its monopoly beyond 
the patent period. They forcefully negate the suggestion that we have here a 
bare arrangement for a sale or a lease at an undetermined price based on 
use. The sale or lease of unpatented machines on long-term payments based 
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on a deferred purchase price or on use would present wholly different 
considerations. Those arrangements seldom rise to the level of a federal 
question. But patents are in the federal domain; and ‘whatever the legal 
device employed’ a projection of the patent monopoly after the patent 
expires is not enforceable. The present licenses draw no line between the 
term of the patent and the post-expiration period. The same provisions as 
respects both use and royalties are applicable to each. The contracts are, 
therefore, on their face a bald attempt to exact the same terms and 
conditions for the period after the patents have expired as they do for the 
monopoly period. We are, therefore, unable to conjecture what the 
bargaining position of the parties might have been and what resultant 
arrangement might have emerged had the provision for post-expiration 
royalties been divorced from the patent and nowise subject to its leverage. 
 
In light of those considerations, we conclude that a patentee’s use of a 
royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is 
unlawful per se. If that device were available to patentees, the free market 
visualized for the post-expiration period would be subject to monopoly 
influences that have no proper place there. 
 
Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827, is not in point. While 
some of the patents under that license apparently had expired, the royalties 
claimed were not for a period when all of them had expired.
1
 That license 
covered several hundred patents and the royalty was based on the licensee’s 
sales, even when no patents were used. The Court held that the computation 
of royalty payments by that formula was a convenient and reasonable 
device. We decline the invitation to extend it so as to project the patent 
monopoly beyond the 17-year period. 
 
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can 
negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to 
project those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to 
an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tieing the sale or use of 
the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones. . . . The 
exaction of royalties for use of a machine after the patent has expired is an 
                                                 
1
 The petition for certiorari did not in the questions presented raise the question 
of the effect of the expiration of any of the patents on the royalty agreement. Also, 
the Hazeltine license, which covered many patents, exacted royalties for patents 
never used. But that aspect of the case is likewise not apposite here for the present 
licensees are farmers using the machines, not manufacturers buying the right to 
incorporate patents into their manufactured products. 
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assertion of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when, as we 
have seen, the patent has entered the public domain. We share the views of 
the Court of Appeals in Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 3 Cir., 
302 F.2d 496, 510, that after expiration of the last of the patents 
incorporated in the machines ‘the grant of patent monopoly was spent’ and 
that an attempt to project it into another term by continuation of the 
licensing agreement is unenforceable. 
 
Reversed. 
 
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. 
 
The Court holds that the Thys Company unlawfully misused its patent 
monopoly by contracting with purchasers of its patented machines for 
royalty payments based on use beyond the patent term. I think that more 
discriminating analysis than the Court has seen fit to give this case produces 
a different result. 
 
The patent laws prohibit post-expiration restrictions on the use of 
patented ideas; they have no bearing on use restrictions upon nonpatented, 
tangible machines. We have before us a mixed case involving the sale of a 
tangible machine which incorporates an intangible, patented idea. My effort 
in what follows is to separate out these two notions, to show that there is no 
substantial restriction on the use of the Thys idea, and to demonstrate that 
what slight restriction there may be is less objectionable than other post-
expiration use restrictions which are clearly acceptable. 
 
It surely cannot be questioned that Thys could have lawfully set a fixed 
price for its machine and extended credit terms beyond the patent period. It 
is equally unquestionable, I take it, that if Thys had had no patent or if its 
patent had expired, it could have sold its machines at a flexible, 
undetermined price based on use; for example, a phonograph record 
manufacturer could sell a recording of a song in the public domain to a 
juke-box owner for an undetermined consideration based on the number of 
times the record was played. 
 
Conversely it should be equally clear that if Thys licensed another 
manufacturer to produce hop-picking machines incorporating any of the 
Thys patents, royalties could not be exacted beyond the patent term. Such 
royalties would restrict the manufacturer’s exploitation of the idea after it 
falls into the public domain, and no such restriction should be valid. To give 
another example unconnected with a tangible machine, a song writer could 
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charge a royalty every time his song—his idea—was sung for profit during 
the period of copyright. But once the song falls into the public domain each 
and every member of the public should be free to sing it. 
 
In fact Thys sells both a machine and the use of an idea. The company 
should be free to restrict the use of its machine, as in the first two examples 
given above. It may not restrict the use of its patented idea once it has fallen 
into the public domain. Whether it has done so must be the point of inquiry. 
 
Consider the situation as of the day the patent monopoly ends. Any 
manufacturer is completely free to produce Thys-type hop-pickers. The 
farmer who has previously purchased a Thys machine is free to buy and use 
any other kind of machine whether or not it incorporates the Thys idea, or 
make one himself if he is able. Of course, he is not entitled as against Thys 
to the free use of any Thys machine. The Court’s opinion must therefore 
ultimately rest on the proposition that the purchasing farmer is restricted in 
using his particular machine, embodying as it does an application of the 
patented idea, by the fact that royalties are tied directly to use. 
 
To test this proposition I again put a hypothetical. Assume that a Thys 
contract called for neither an initial flat-sum payment nor any annual 
minimum royalties; Thys’ sole recompense for giving up ownership of its 
machine was a royalty payment extending beyond the patent term based on 
use, without any requirement either to use the machine or not to use a 
competitor’s. A moment’s thought reveals that, despite the clear restriction 
on use both before and after the expiration of the patent term, the 
arrangement would involve no misuse of patent leverage. Unless the 
Court’s opinion rests on technicalities of contract draftsmanship and not on 
the economic substance of the transaction, the distinction between the 
hypothetical and the actual case lies only in the cumulative investment 
consisting of the initial and minimum payments independent of use, which 
the purchaser obligated himself to make to Thys. I fail to see why this 
distinguishing feature should be critical. If anything the investment will 
encourage the purchaser to use his machine in order to amortize the 
machine’s fixed cost over as large a production base as possible. Yet the 
gravamen of the majority opinion is restriction, not encouragement, of 
use….. 
 
In fact a distinction should not be accepted based on the assumption that 
Thys, which exploits its patents by selling its patented machines rather than 
licensing others to manufacture them, can use its patent leverage to exact 
more onerous payments from farmers by gearing price to use instead of 
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charging a flat sum. Four possible situations must be considered. The 
purchasing farmer could overestimate, exactly estimate, underestimate, or 
have no firm estimate of his use requirements for a Thys machine. If he 
overestimates or exactly estimates, the farmer will be fully aware of what 
the machine will cost him in the long run, and it is unrealistic to suppose 
that in such circumstances he would be willing to pay more to have the 
machine on use than on straight terms. If the farmer underestimates, the 
thought may be that Thys will take advantage of him; but surely the farmer 
is in a better position than Thys or anyone else to estimate his own 
requirements and is hardly in need of the Court’s protection in this respect. 
If the farmer has no fixed estimate of his use requirements he may have 
good business reasons entirely unconnected with ‘patent leverage’ for 
wanting payments tied to use, and may indeed be willing to pay more in the 
long run to obtain such an arrangement. On final example should illustrate 
my point: 
 
At the time when the Thys patent term still has a few years to run, a 
farmer who has been picking his hops by hand comes into the Thys retail 
outlet to inquire about the mechanical pickers. The salesman concludes his 
description of the advantages of the Thys machine with the price tag—
$20,000. Value to the farmer depends completely on the use he will derive 
from the machine; he is willing to obligate himself on long credit terms to 
pay $10,000, but unless the machine can substantially outpick his old hand-
picking methods, it is worth no more to him. He therefore offers to pay 
$2,000 down, $400 annually for 20 years, and an additional payment during 
the contract term for any production he can derive from the machine over 
and above the minimum amount he could pick by hand. Thys accepts, and 
by doing so, according to the majority, commits a per se misuse of its 
patent. I cannot believe that this is good law. 
 
I would affirm.  
 
SCHEIBER v. DOLBY LABS., INC. 
293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002) 
 
POSNER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The plaintiff in a suit to enforce a patent licensing agreement appeals to 
us from the grant of summary judgment to the defendants, Dolby for short. 
Scheiber, the plaintiff, a musician turned inventor who held U.S. and 
Canadian patents on the audio system known as “surround sound,” sued 
Dolby in 1983 for infringement of his patents. The parties settled the suit by 
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agreeing that Scheiber would license his patents to Dolby in exchange for 
royalties. The last U.S. patent covered by the agreement was scheduled to 
expire in May 1993, while the last Canadian patent was not scheduled to 
expire until September 1995. During the settlement negotiations Dolby 
suggested to Scheiber that in exchange for a lower royalty rate the license 
agreement provide that royalties on all the patents would continue until the 
Canadian patent expired, including, therefore, patents that had already 
expired. That way Dolby could, it hoped, pass on the entire royalty expense 
to its sublicensees without their balking at the rate. Scheiber acceded to the 
suggestion and the agreement was drafted accordingly, but Dolby later 
refused to pay royalties on any patent after it expired, precipitating this suit. 
Federal jurisdiction over the suit is based on diversity of citizenship, 
because a suit to enforce a patent licensing agreement does not arise under 
federal patent law. 
 
Dolby argues that the duty to pay royalties on any patent covered by the 
agreement expired by the terms of the agreement itself as soon as the patent 
expired, because the royalties were to be based on Dolby’s sales of 
equipment within the scope of the patents and once a patent expires, Dolby 
argues, there is no equipment within its scope. The argument would make 
meaningless the provision that Dolby itself proposed for continuing the 
payment of royalties until the last patent expired. Anyway the reference to 
equipment within the scope of the patent was clearly meant to identify the 
equipment on which royalties would be based (Dolby makes equipment that 
does not utilize Scheiber’s patents as well as equipment that does) rather 
than to limit the duration of the obligation to pay royalties. 
 
Dolby’s principal argument is that the Supreme Court held in a decision 
that has never been overruled that a patent owner may not enforce a contract 
for the payment of patent royalties beyond the expiration date of the patent. 
The decision was Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), dutifully 
followed by lower courts, including our own, in such cases as Meehan v. 
PPG Industries, Inc., 802 F.2d 881, 883 (7th Cir.1986); Virginia Panel 
Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed.Cir.1997), and Boggild v. 
Kenner Products, 776 F.2d 1315, 1318–19 (6th Cir.1985). Brulotte involved 
an agreement licensing patents that expired at different dates, just like this 
case; the two cases are indistinguishable. The decision has, it is true, been 
severely, and as it seems to us, with all due respect, justly, criticized, 
beginning with Justice Harlan’s dissent, 379 U.S. at 34, and continuing with 
our opinion in USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510–11 
(7th Cir.1982). The Supreme Court’s majority opinion reasoned that by 
extracting a promise to continue paying royalties after expiration of the 
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patent, the patentee extends the patent beyond the term fixed in the patent 
statute and therefore in violation of the law. That is not true. After the 
patent expires, anyone can make the patented process or product without 
being guilty of patent infringement. The patent can no longer be used to 
exclude anybody from such production. Expiration thus accomplishes what 
it is supposed to accomplish. For a licensee in accordance with a provision 
in the license agreement to go on paying royalties after the patent expires 
does not extend the duration of the patent either technically or practically, 
because, as this case demonstrates, if the licensee agrees to continue paying 
royalties after the patent expires the royalty rate will be lower. The duration 
of the patent fixes the limit of the patentee’s power to extract royalties; it is 
a detail whether he extracts them at a higher rate over a shorter period of 
time or a lower rate over a longer period of time. 
 
This insight is not original with us. “The Brulotte rule incorrectly 
assumes that a patent license has significance after the patent terminates. 
When the patent term ends, the exclusive right to make, use or sell the 
licensed invention also ends. Because the invention is available to the 
world, the license in fact ceases to have value. Presumably, licensees know 
this when they enter into a licensing agreement. If the licensing agreement 
calls for royalty payments beyond the patent term, the parties base those 
payments on the licensees’ assessment of the value of the license during the 
patent period. These payments, therefore, do not represent an extension in 
time of the patent monopoly. . . . Courts do not remove the obligation of the 
consignee to pay because payment after receipt is an extension of market 
power—it is simply a division of the payment-for-delivery transaction. 
Royalties beyond the patent term are no different. If royalties are calculated 
on post-patent term sales, the calculation is simply a risk-shifting credit 
arrangement between patentee and licensee. The arrangement can be no 
more than that, because the patentee at that time has nothing else to sell.” 
Harold See & Frank M. Caprio, “The Trouble with Brulotte: the Patent 
Royalty Term and Patent Monopoly Extension,” 1990 Utah L.Rev. 813, 
814, 851; to similar effect see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “Dethroning 
Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate,” 72 Va. L.Rev. 677, 
709–12 (1986). “[T]he Supreme Court refused to see that typically such 
post-expiration royalties merely amortize the price of using patented 
technology.” 10 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶ 
1782c2–c3, pp. 505–11 (1996). 
 
These criticisms might be wide of the mark if Brulotte had been based 
on a[n] interpretation of the patent clause of the Constitution, or of the 
patent statute or any other statute; but it seems rather to have been a free-
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                            Chap. 7, Page 54 
Hovenkamp                                                                  Dec. 2012 
 
floating product of a misplaced fear of monopoly (“a patentee’s use of a 
royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is 
unlawful per se. If that device were available to patentees, the free market 
visualized for the post-expiration period would be subject to monopoly 
influences that have no proper place there”) that was not even tied to one of 
the antitrust statutes. 10 Areeda et al., supra, at ¶¶ 1782c2, 1782c3, pp. 505, 
511. The doctrinal basis of the decision was the doctrine of patent misuse, 
of which more later. 
 
A patent confers a monopoly, and the longer the term of the patent the 
greater the monopoly. The limitation of the term of a patent, besides being 
commanded by the Constitution, and necessary to avoid impossible tracing 
problems (imagine if some caveman had gotten a perpetual patent on the 
wheel), serves to limit the monopoly power conferred on the patentee. But 
as we have pointed out, charging royalties beyond the term of the patent 
does not lengthen the patentee’s monopoly; it merely alters the timing of 
royalty payments. This would be obvious if the license agreement between 
Scheiber and Dolby had become effective a month before the last patent 
expired. The parties could have agreed that Dolby would pay royalties for 
the next 100 years, but obviously the royalty rate would be minuscule 
because of the imminence of the patent’s expiration. 
 
However, we have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no 
matter how dubious its reasoning strikes us, or even how out of touch with 
the Supreme Court’s current thinking the decision seems…. 
 
Now it is true that in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 
(1979), a case decided some years after Brulotte, the Supreme Court upheld 
an agreement superficially similar to the one invalidated in Brulotte and at 
issue in the present case: a patent applicant granted a license for the 
invention it hoped to patent to a firm that agreed, if a patent were not 
granted, to pay the inventor–applicant royalties for as long as the firm sold 
products embodying the invention. The Court was careful to distinguish 
Brulotte, and not a single Justice suggested that any cloud had been cast 
over the earlier decision. Since no patent was granted, the doctrine of patent 
misuse could not be brought into play, and there was no other federal 
ground for invalidating the license. The Court emphasized that Brulotte had 
been based on the “leverage” that the patent had granted the patentee to 
extract royalties beyond the date of expiration, and that leverage was of 
course missing in Aronson. 
 
If Aronson and Brulotte were inconsistent with each other and the Court 
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had not reaffirmed Brulotte in Aronson, then we would have to follow 
Aronson, the later opinion, since to follow Brulotte in those circumstances 
would be to overrule Aronson. But the reaffirmation of Brulotte in Aronson 
tells us that the Court did not deem the cases inconsistent, and so, whether 
we agree or not, we have no warrant for declaring Brulotte overruled. 
 
Scheiber argues further, however, that Brulotte has been superseded by 
a 1988 amendment to the patent statute which provides, so far as bears on 
this case, that “no patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement 
. . . shall be . . . deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent 
right by reason of his having . . . conditioned the license of any rights to the 
patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to 
rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product” unless the 
patentee has market power in the market for the conditioning product 
(which is not argued here). 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5). The statute is doubly 
inapplicable to this case. It merely limits defenses to infringement suits, and 
Scheiber isn’t suing for infringement; he’s suing to enforce a license 
agreement. He can’t sue for infringement; his patents have expired. 
Scheiber argues that since the agreement was in settlement of his 
infringement suit, the only effect of limiting the statute to such suits would 
be to dissuade patentees from settling them. Not so. Had Scheiber pressed 
his 1983 infringement suit against Dolby to judgment, he would not have 
obtained royalties beyond the expiration date of his patents, because Dolby 
had not as yet agreed to pay any royalties; there was no license agreement 
before the case was settled. The significance of the statute is that if some 
subsequent infringer should point to the license agreement with Dolby as a 
misuse of Scheiber’s patent by reason of the tying together of different 
patents, Scheiber could plead the statute as a bar to the infringer’s defense 
of patent misuse. 
 
In any event, the new statutory defense is explicitly limited to tying,..  
normally of a nonpatented product to a patented product…. The 1988 
amendment limited the tying doctrine, in cases in which the tying product is 
a patent, to situations in which the patentee has real market power, not 
merely the technical monopoly (right to exclude) that every patent confers. 
But it is not … bundling … on which Dolby pitches its refusal to pay 
royalties; it is the duration of the royalty obligation. The objection would be 
the same if there were a single patent and the agreement required the 
licensee to continue paying royalties after the patent expired. 
 
Brulotte called extending the royalty obligation beyond the term of the 
patent analogous to tying, because the traditional objection to tying as we 
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noted is that by telling the buyer that he can’t buy the tying product unless 
he agrees to buy a separate product from the seller as well, the seller is 
trying to “lever” or “extend” his monopoly to the market for that separate 
product: only extending it in product space rather than in time. Yet if the 
seller tries to charge a monopoly price for that separate product, the buyer 
will not be willing to pay as much for the tying product as he would if the 
separate product, which he has to buy also, were priced at a lower rate. 
Acquiring monopoly power in the tied-product market comes at the expense 
of losing it in the tying-product market. Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1202–03 (3d Cir.1995); Hirsh v. 
Martindale–Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1349 n. 19 (9th Cir.1982). Thus, 
as these cases and a tidal wave of legal and economic scholarship point out, 
the idea that you can use tying to lever your way to a second (or, in the 
post-expiration patent royalty setting, a longer and therefore greater) 
monopoly is economic nonsense, imputing systematic irrationality to 
businessmen. Congress seems to have recognized this in the 1988 
amendment. But even if the amendment should therefore be interpreted to 
reject the rationale of the tying cases, and even though the rationale of 
Brulotte is materially identical to that of the discredited tying cases—the 
Court even invoked “leverage” (as it emphasized later in Aronson ), saying 
that to “use that leverage [the power conferred by the monopoly] to project 
those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an 
effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent,” 379 U.S. at 33—and not a 
whit stronger (probably even weaker, since there is only one product), it 
would not follow that the statute had changed the rule of that case. Congress 
isn’t constrained, as courts like to think they are, to rule logically. Most 
statutes are the product of compromise, and compromises need not cut at 
the logical joints of a controversy. There just is no evidence that Congress 
in the 1988 amendment wanted to go or did go beyond tying. Had it wanted 
to, it would have chosen different words. We are not literalists, but there 
must be some semantic handle on which to hang a proposed statutory 
interpretation, and there is none here…. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1. Brulotte is an odd misuse decision in one sense.  Nearly all misuse cases 
arise as defenses to infringement suits.  In Brulotte, however, the patentee 
had brought a state court breach of contract action to enforce the license 
agreement, and the contract defendant raised the royalty extension 
agreement as a defense.  See Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 62 Wash.2d 284, 382 
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P.2d 271 (1963).   Why are not more misuse claims raised as defenses in 
contract suits?  Under the first sale doctrine (see Chapter Ten), a patentee 
may not enforce a tying condition via a patent infringement suit once the 
patented tying good has been sold; however, it may continue to enforce 
lawful tying or other clauses by breach of contract actions.  See CHRISTINA 
BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, chs. 10 & 13 (2011). 
  
2. As Judge Posner’s opinion in Scheiber suggests, Brulotte v. Thys Co. has 
no shortage of critics. But in a 2007 decision, the Ninth Circuit questioned 
whether Brulotte’s detractors overstate its flaws. Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 
F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2007). In the mid-1970s, while serving as house 
physician at a large Las Vegas hotel, James Tinnell developed a treatment 
for oral and genital herpes. He applied for a patent and set up a corporation, 
Zila, Inc., to market and sell his invention, which he called Zilactin. In 
1980, while the patent application was still pending, Tinnell and Zila 
entered into a licensing agreement in which Tinell assigned to Zila any and 
all patent rights he might come to have in Zilactin and Zila agreed to pay 
Tinnell a five percent royalty on its gross sales of Zilactin in perpetuity. The 
Zila officers who signed the agreement testified that the “obligation to pay 
Tinnell royalties was not related in any way to the patents that might or 
might not be obtained by [Zila] as a result of Tinnell’s previously filed 
patent application.” Zila, 502 F.3d at 1017. Eventually, three patents issued 
on Zilactin—a U.S. patent in 1981, a Canadian patent in 1985, and an 
improvement on the U.S. patent in 1992 (for which Zila “inexplicably” 
named its regulatory specialist, not Tinnell, as the inventor). 
 
By July 2000, annual sales of Zilactin had grown from $321,000 to 
more than $8 million, and Zila was paying Tinnell half a million dollars in 
royalties each year. But in September 2000, the company stopped paying 
Tinnell on the grounds that under Brulotte, Tinnell’s right to royalties had 
expired in August 1998, when the 1981 patent had expired. Zila filed a 
complaint seeking declaratory judgment that the expiration of the 1981 
patent had terminated the licensing agreement and reimbursement for the 
royalties it paid after the patent expired. Tinnell counterclaimed for 
declaratory relief, arguing that his right to royalties did not expire with the 
1981 patent but rather continued in perpetuity, and sought damages under 
state law for breach of contract and fraud. 
 
The district court applied Brulotte and ruled that the 1980 agreement 
was “‘unlawful per se under federal patent law’ because it ‘project[ed] 
beyond the expiration of the patent.’” Zila, 502 F.3d at 1018. Significantly, 
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while Zila had argued that it did not have to pay royalties on the Canadian 
patent because it had paid overpaid on the first U.S. patent, the district court 
“went further”: it held that the unlawful licensing agreement meant that Zila 
no longer had to pay royalties on any of the three patents.  The court 
acknowledged that the result seemed unfair, but wrote that Brulotte left it no 
choice. 
  
In reversing, the Ninth Circuit wrote that “Brulotte indicates that under 
some circumstances patent owners cannot exact royalties for use of patented 
devices beyond the duration of their patents,” and “it does so for a reason 
that many courts and commentators have found economically unconvincing, 
namely, that ‘the free market visualized for the post-expiration period 
would be subject to monopoly influences’ if ‘a royalty agreement [was 
allowed to] project[] beyond the expiration date of the patent.’”  But the 
court saw a potentially crucial difference between the two cases: while the 
royalty agreement in Brulotte depended on the existence of a patent, Zila’s 
licensing agreement with Tinnell did not. Furthermore, in Brulotte, it was 
“because of post-patent-expiration contractual restrictions other than 
royalties that the Thys Company could not collect the royalties after the 
patents expired”: 
 
Specifically, the Court in Brulotte noted that, although 
the farmers bought the hop-picking machines outright and 
title transferred, they were forced to obtain a license to 
actually use the machines; the licenses could not be assigned, 
making the machines the farmers purchased worthless for 
subsequent sales; the farmers were forbidden from moving 
their machines out of the county, whether or not they 
intended to use them elsewhere; and the license charged both 
a sliding royalty rate and a minimum fee, depending on use. 
It is only “in view of [these] other provisions of the license 
agreements” that the Court found the unchanging royalty rate 
to be “peculiarly significant.” The Court emphasized that the 
presence of “[t]hose restrictions,” rather than the royalty 
alone, in the “post-expiration period [was] a telltale sign that 
the licensor was using the licenses to project its monopoly 
beyond the patent period.” In other words, the Thys 
Company was not simply attempting to charge a royalty after 
the patent expired; it was acting in all respects as if the 
patent remained in place. 
  
The Ninth Circuit observed that “every other circuit to consider Brulotte has 
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ignored the relevance” of the use restrictions to Brulotte’s holding, but the 
court couldn’t quite say that the consensus view was wrong. In the interest 
of “national uniformity concerns,” it adopted the majority approach and 
asked “not whether but the extent to which Brulotte preempts state law with 
regard to a contract for payment of royalties on the sale of an invention that 
may be patented, if a patent indeed issues on the invention.” 
  
Ultimately, the court held that Brulotte “does not render an entire 
contract void”—just “that portion of a license agreement that demands 
royalty payments beyond the expiration of the patent for which the royalties 
are paid.”  Further, it held Zila owed royalties on the Canadian patent 
because Brulotte doesn’t “extend its royalty-canceling powers to contracts 
for foreign patents.” 
 
3. In NOVA Chemicals, Inc. v. Sekisui Plastics Co., the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals acknowledged that “the economic reasoning in Brulotte 
has been criticized,” but it dutifully noted that the case “remains good law 
and binding precedent.” 579 F.3d 319, 327 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 
Still, like the Ninth Circuit in Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, the Third Circuit was 
careful not to extend Brulotte’s holding.  Sekisui Plastics patented Piocelan, 
a polystyrene–polyethyline foam used to manufacture automobile parts and 
food packaging materials, among other goods. In 1983, Sekisui and ARCO 
Chemical Company entered into a licensing agreement that gave ARCO 
exclusive rights to use the Piocelan patent and related trade secrets to make 
and sell Piocelan in the United States and Canada for three years. The 
agreement also granted ARCO an option to extend the license for another 
ten years, during which it would continue to have exclusive rights in the 
U.S. and Canada and would also get nonexclusive rights in the rest of the 
world, with the exception of most of the major Asian markets. In exchange, 
ARCO agreed to pay Sekisui $100,000 for the initial three-year license, and 
a lump sum of $500,000 and running royalties on ARCO’s Piocelan sales 
during the ten-year license. ARCO exercised the option in 1985, and in 
1996, NOVA Chemicals bought ARCO and became a party to the 
agreement.  
 
In 2002, NOVA started selling Piocelan products in Asia, and when 
Sekisui objected, NOVA sought declaratory judgment that the license 
agreement “had a defined term of ten years and expired thereafter.” Id. at 
324. Sekisui counterclaimed for breach of contract, arguing that the terms of 
the agreement in fact gave NOVA a permanent license to sell and use 
Sekisui’s Piocelan patent and trade secrets once the $500,000 lump sum and 
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running royalties for the ten-year period were “fully paid-up.”  Furthermore, 
Sekisui argued, because this “fully paid-up” license had no expiration date, 
the licensing agreement barred NOVA from selling in the Asian markets 
indefinitely. 
 
The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for NOVA because the 
license agreement “clearly expired along with Sekisui’s intellectual property 
rights.” Citing Brulotte, the court wrote that “[if] the License Agreement 
were only based on patent rights, it is implicit that it would have terminated 
with the expiration of those patent rights.” Id. at 327.  
 
Perhaps recognizing its Brulotte problem, Sekisui stressed that the 
license was not based on patent rights alone and argued that its trade secrets 
were in fact the “heart” of the agreement.   “Unlike a patent monopoly, 
trade secret protections are theoretically unlimited in duration, lasting as 
long as the information remains a trade secret.”  Furthermore, trade secret 
licenses “may endure even where the trade secret itself is destroyed by 
general disclosure.”   In this case, however, the agreement did not prohibit 
NOVA from revealing Sekisui’s trade secrets after the ten-year license 
expired, which seemed “inconsistent with the notion that trade secrets, 
rather than patent rights, were at the heart of the license.”  
 
Suppose you were writing a license agreement for software owned by 
your client and that was protected by both copyright and some patents.  
While the patents had a few years remaining, the copyright would last for 
another eighty or more years.  How would you draft the agreement? 
 
4. Michael Risch argues that cases like Brulotte, which helped create “an 
unfettered right to challenge patents,” have also led to a phenomenon he 
calls royalty inflation. See Michael Risch, Patent Challenges and Royalty 
Inflation, 85 Ind. L.J. 1003, 1007–08, 1018-1019 (2010). In Professor 
Risch’s analysis, a patentee “will always perceive a chance, however small, 
that the licensee will challenge the patent.” This risk “decreases the 
expected value of any royalty stream by imposing additional costs on the 
patentee, including potential attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs, 
potential loss of royalties, and interference with other licenses if the patent 
is invalidated.” Such costs “are essentially an excise tax on each patent 
license—a patent-challenge tax.” And “[l]ike any tax, the burden will be 
shared in part by the licensee in the form of higher royalties.”  On top of 
these “inflated royalties, the tax causes trickle-down costs to consumers and 
disincentives to create and license patented technology.”  Do you agree?  
Land with questionable title almost always sells for less than land with good 
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title?  Do patents operate differently?  Or are the issues not the same? 
 
COUNTY MATERIALS CORP. v. ALLAN BLOCK CORP. 
502 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2007) 
 
WOOD, Circuit Judge. 
 
. . . County Materials is in the business of manufacturing concrete 
blocks. Allan Block develops, markets, and licenses technology for the 
manufacturing of concrete blocks; it does not manufacture blocks itself. In 
April 1993, County Materials’s predecessor in interest, County Concrete 
Corporation, entered into a production agreement with Allan Block. The 
Agreement granted to County Materials the exclusive right to manufacture 
Allan Block’s patented block products in northwest Wisconsin. County also 
was granted the right to sell these products under the Allan Block 
trademark. Finally, Allan Block agreed to provide County Materials with 
significant technical, marketing, and strategic support while the Agreement 
was in effect. 
 
The Agreement included a limited covenant not to compete, which 
allowed County Materials to make and sell two specific competing block 
products, without any time restrictions. The non-compete provision also 
required that for the 18 months following the termination of the Agreement, 
County Materials could not “directly or indirectly engage in the 
manufacture and/or sale of any other [competing] . . . block.” 
 
In 2005, Allan Block notified County Materials that it would be 
terminating the Agreement. Shortly thereafter, County Materials completed 
its own design for a new concrete block that would compete directly with 
the Allan Block products that it had been manufacturing and selling in 
northwest Wisconsin. As County Materials took steps to begin producing 
this new block, Allan Block threatened that it would sue to enforce the non-
compete provision from the terminated Agreement. County Materials 
decided to move first, and so it filed this suit alleging that the inclusion of 
the non-compete provision in the Agreement constituted patent misuse, 
which made the Agreement void. 
 
. . . This court reviews a district court’s decision to grant summary 
judgment de novo. Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec 
Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir.2003). The parties appear to agree that 
the production agreement is a patent license, which is the way that we too 
would characterize it. County Materials essentially claims that the inclusion 
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of the covenant not to compete in the patent license here was per se 
unlawful patent misuse and the improper result of patent leverage. While at 
one time this argument might have had traction, in certain circumstances, it 
is at least disfavored today, if not entirely rejected. Today, the concept of 
patent misuse is cabined first by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), which 
essentially eliminates from the field of “patent misuse” claims based on 
tying and refusals to deal, unless the patent owner has market power, and 
second by case law. As the Federal Circuit explained in Virginia Panel 
Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed.Cir.1997), there are certain 
practices that court identified as “constituting per se patent misuse,” 
including “arrangements in which a patentee effectively extends the term of 
its patent by requiring post-expiration royalties.” Id. at 869; see also 
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (holding that “a patentee’s use of a 
royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is 
unlawful per se ”). The practices identified in § 271(d), in contrast, may not 
be branded “misuse.” Va. Panel Corp., 133 F.3d at 869. 
 
If a practice is not per se unlawful nor specifically excluded from a 
misuse analysis by § 271(d) a court must determine if that practice is 
reasonably within the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject matter 
within the scope of the patent claims. If so, the practice does not have the 
effect of broadening the scope of the patent claims and thus cannot 
constitute patent misuse. If, on the other hand, the practice has the effect of 
extending the patentee’s statutory rights and does so with an anti-
competitive effect, that practice must then be analyzed in accordance with 
the rule of reason. Under the rule of reason, the finder of fact must decide 
whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on 
competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific 
information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect. 
 
County Materials is not claiming that Allan Block was trying to extend 
the term of its patent by requiring post-expiration royalties. It is wrong, 
therefore, to argue that some form of per se analysis applies here. (By the 
same token, we have no need to explore further the question whether it 
makes any economic sense to treat these arrangements so harshly. See 
Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1020, which questions the economic soundness of per 
se condemnation.) The covenant not to compete in the agreement before us 
must therefore be assessed under a rule of reason. County Materials argues 
that this clause is unreasonable because it allows Allan Block to use its 
patent to exclude competition in the market from unpatented products. 
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As County Materials recognizes, it is essentially making a leveraging 
argument. It argues both that “[l]everage is presumed” and that there is a 
“proper method to conclude whether patent leverage was used.” Whatever 
else one might say about leveraging theory (which as we noted in Scheiber 
has been criticized in academic circles), however, there is no doubt that 
there is nothing “presumed” about it outside the narrow confines of post-
expiration royalties. In Brulotte, the Supreme Court held that there are both 
proper and improper uses of patent leverage. It acknowledged that “[a] 
patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate 
with the leverage of that monopoly[, b]ut to use that leverage to project 
those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an 
effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent.” 379 U.S. at 33 (emphasis 
added). But as both Congress and the Court have come to recognize, it may 
not be possible to exercise any leverage at all from a patent, if that patent 
does not confer any market power upon its owner. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. 
v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006)…. 
 
 The Federal Circuit’s decision in Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 
782 F.2d 995 (Fed.Cir.1986), provides helpful guidance in deciding whether 
a particular use of a patent might amount to “misuse” and thus furnish the 
defense to a licensing agreement that County Materials is looking for. In 
Windsurfing, the Federal Circuit said that patent misuse does not exist 
unless the party asserting it can “show that the patentee has impermissibly 
broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with anti-
competitive effect.” This standard is satisfied by showing some overall 
harm to competition, and so, contrary to County Materials’s contentions, it 
fully takes into account the fact that patents exist to “spur progress and 
innovation.” The Windsurfing standard for patent misuse necessarily 
considers whether progress and innovation have been stymied and allows 
courts concretely to answer the vague question whether progress has been 
slowed…. 
 
Anticompetitive effects, in short, are a critical element of any patent 
misuse case that is evaluated under a rule of reason approach. Windsurfing 
was one of the first cases to recognize this; it required “a factual 
determination [that] . . . reveal[s] that the overall effect of the license tends 
to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined relevant 
market.”…  A plaintiff is not required to show a defendant’s subjective 
intent to obtain some kind of leverage over its patent. We assume, for the 
sake of argument, that it is also not necessary for a plaintiff to plead a case 
that would suffice to show that the antitrust laws have been violated. But, at 
the summary judgment stage, some evidence tending to show an adverse 
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effect in an economically sound relevant market is essential for any claim 
governed by the rule of reason. 
 
With these principles in mind, we are ready to assess County 
Materials’s case. To begin with, the Agreement between County Materials 
and Allan Block shows no sign of one-sidedness or abuse of power on Allan 
Block’s part. County Materials received significant benefits, starting with 
the right to use the patented technology for the manufacture of the concrete 
blocks, and continuing with the right to use Allan Block’s trademark and 
the right to receive supporting technical, marketing, and strategic services 
from Allan Block. In return, County Materials had to promise to pay 
royalties to Allan Block and to devote significant efforts to the exploitation 
of Allan Block’s patent. If County Materials had been free to pick and 
choose among all potentially competing products on the market, Allan 
Block may have signed over the rights to use its patent and know-how for 
little or nothing in return. Allan Block’s services alone have considerable 
value for any company undertaking the manufacture and sale of these 
products (or so the parties could have concluded), whether or not they are 
tied to a patented product. Nothing in these facts suggests that Allan Block 
needed or used any kind of leverage made possible by the patent to secure 
County Materials’s promise to refrain from working with all but the 
designated two competing products, or its promise to refrain from using 
other products for 18 months after the expiration of the Agreement. 
 
In fact, this was not a particularly onerous covenant not to compete. It 
allowed County Materials to continue to manufacture and sell not one but 
two competing products, which the district court reasoned would “guarantee 
plaintiff could always compete with defendant in the landscape block 
market.” In addition, the clause had both temporal and geographical limits. 
It lasted for only 18 months after the Agreement’s termination (a period 
which no one contends goes beyond the duration of Allan Block’s patent) 
and applied only to County Materials’s exclusive production territory, 
which was a section of Wisconsin. Although the non-compete clause may 
have hurt County Materials’s ability to compete as aggressively as it would 
have liked in the concrete block market in northwest Wisconsin, there does 
not appear to be any evidence in the record showing that these limited 
requirements have hurt competition for cement blocks in County 
Materials’s former exclusive territory. In the related field of antitrust, the 
Supreme Court has said that “[i]t is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were 
passed for the protection of competition, not competitors.” Brooke Group 
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Independent Ink, supra, held that the 
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principles underlying the patent misuse doctrine are closely aligned to those 
underlying antitrust law. Without a showing that this clause had any effect 
on the broader market for concrete block (as opposed to an effect only on 
County Materials), its purported patent misuse defense cannot succeed. . . .  
 
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BAYER AG v. HOUSEY PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. 
228 F.Supp.2d 467 (D. Del. 2002), 
aff'd, 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
 
SUE L. ROBINSON, Chief Judge. 
 
. . . The ICT patents, each entitled, “Method of Screening for Protein 
Inhibitors and Activators,” generally relate to research methods used by 
pharmaceutical companies for discovering drugs. (D.I.1) The patented 
methods enable companies to screen substances for active compounds that 
indicate a potential for development as pharmaceuticals. (Id.) This court’s 
October 17, 2001 order found that the defendant’s patents cover only 
research methods, not manufacturing methods. See Bayer AG v. Housey 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 169 F.Supp.2d 328 (D.Del.2001). Thus, the patent 
claims at issue do not cover end products, but rather the identification and 
generation of data used to develop new pharmaceuticals. . . .  
 
Defendant has agreed to, and proposed, two different types of licensing 
arrangements with licensees and potential licensees. One type is a running 
royalty license that requires the licensee to pay a royalty for sales of 
pharmaceutical products discovered using the subject invention. . . . The 
second type is a lump sum payment license that requires the licensee to pay 
a lump sum royalty based upon the licensee’s research and development 
budget. 
 
Patent misuse is an equitable defense to a charge of patent infringement. 
The basic allegation is that the patentee has “extend[ed] the economic 
benefit beyond the scope of the patent grant.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 
Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703–04 (Fed.Cir.1992)). Patent misuse 
“requires that the alleged infringer show that the patentee has impermissibly 
broadened the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant with 
anticompetitive effect.” Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 
860, 868–71 (Fed.Cir.1997). 
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Plaintiffs assert defendant has committed the following acts of patent 
misuse: (1) extracting and attempting to extract royalties on products and 
activities that are not covered by the claims of any of the patents in suit; (2) 
imposing a requirement of royalty payments beyond the term of the patent; 
and (3) attempting to muzzle licensees. Defendant denies each of these 
allegations and asserts that, regardless of whether the above acts were 
committed, patent misuse requires an anti-competitive effect that is lacking 
in this case. The court will discuss each of plaintiffs’ allegations in turn. 
 
A. Extracting and Attempting to Extract Royalties on Products and 
Activities That Are Not Covered by the Claims of Any of the 
Patents in Suit 
 
 1. License Agreements and Proposals Based on Products and 
Activities not Covered by the Patents 
 
Citing both the existing licensing agreements and the licensing 
proposals, plaintiffs argue that defendant has insisted upon licenses that 
impose royalties on products and activities not covered by the patents. 
According to plaintiffs, this constitutes patent misuse. Defendant asserts 
that it has not conditioned the grant of a license on the inclusion of 
unpatented products and activities and, thus, cannot have committed patent 
misuse. Defendant further argues that license agreements based on products 
and activities not covered by the patent are not patent misuse if the license 
agreements are for the convenience of the parties. 
 
Plaintiffs rely on Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 
U.S. 100 (1969), for their contention that defendant’s licensing activities 
constitute patent misuse. In Zenith Radio, the Supreme Court held “that 
conditioning the grant of a patent license upon payment of royalties on 
products which do not use the teaching of the patent does amount to patent 
misuse.” The Court, however, limited the holding to particularly egregious 
circumstances. In refusing to reverse the district court’s injunction, the 
Court stated: 
 
The trial court’s injunction does not purport to prevent 
the parties from serving their mutual convenience by basing 
royalties on the sale of all radios and television sets, 
irrespective of the use of [the patentee’s] inventions. The 
injunction reaches only situations where the patentee directly 
or indirectly “conditions” his license upon the payment of 
royalties on unpatented products—that is, where the patentee 
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refuses to license on any other basis and leaves the licensee 
with the choice between a license so providing and no 
license at all. . . .  
 
. . . Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that defendant has 
impermissibly “conditioned” its licenses upon royalty provisions covering 
unpatented products and activities. Plaintiffs have only established that 
licensees, including themselves, have objected to the terms proposed by 
defendant. Specifically, after receiving the initial offer from defendant, 
plaintiffs determined that the patents were invalid and the proposed 
licensing terms were improper. Defendant continued to make numerous 
offers to plaintiffs over the next several years. Plaintiffs make much of the 
fact that the license terms and proposals were drafted by defendant. 
However, plaintiffs provide no evidence of ever offering other terms they 
felt were equally convenient and more appropriate. In Zenith Radio, relied 
on by plaintiffs, the Supreme Court stated that “misuse inheres in a 
patentee’s insistence on a percentage-of-sales royalty . . . and his rejections 
of licensee proposals to pay for actual use.” 395 U.S. at 139. In the case at 
bar, plaintiffs provided no evidence of proposing a licensing arrangement to 
pay for actual use. Rather, they blame defendant for not doing so. . . .  
 
The court finds that defendant has not impermissibly conditioned a 
license upon royalty provisions covering unpatented products and activities. 
Thus, on this point, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied and 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. . . .  
 
B. Imposing a Requirement of Royalty Payments Beyond the Term 
of the Patent 
 
The license agreement with SCIOS Inc. (“SCIOS”) contains the 
following section regarding royalty payments: 
 
In the case of an End Product that is not a Licensed 
Product and is not covered per se or for a given purpose by 
any patents obtained by LICENSEE, the obligation to pay 
royalties shall end ten (10) years after the last to expire of the 
patents in the Licensed Patent Rights having a claim or 
claims for a Licensed Method utilized in discovering, 
creating, identifying, characterizing, isolating, developing, 
manufacturing, evaluating or establishing the 
pharmacological properties or condition of use of the End 
Product (or a component thereof) for the given purpose. 
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Plaintiffs assert that this royalty clause in the SCIOS license requires the 
payment of royalties after the expiration of the patent. Relying on the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), 
plaintiffs argue this constitutes patent misuse per se. 
 
Defendant asserts that the license provision is not patent misuse per se 
for two reasons. First, the license provision only imposes royalties for use 
of the subject invention during the life of the patent. The royalties paid after 
the expiration of the patent, on pharmaceuticals sold after the expiration of 
the patent, are actually royalties for use of the invention during the research 
phase of the pharmaceutical—the research phase that occurred prior to the 
expiration of the patent. Second, defendant argues, the license provision is 
not patent misuse unless defendant actually attempts to collect post-
expiration royalties. The mere presence of a clause permitting collection of 
post-expiration royalties is not patent misuse. 
 
In Brulotte, the Supreme Court held that patent misuse occurs when a 
licensing agreement “allows royalties to be collected which accrued after 
the last of the patents . . . [has] expired.” 379 U.S. at 30.  In the case at bar, 
the royalties to be paid after the expiration of the patent are for the use of 
the subject invention prior to the expiration of the patent. Royalties are 
collected based on later pharmaceutical sales, but the royalties are being 
accrued as the invention is practiced during the research phase. Collecting 
royalties after the expiration of the patent has expired is not per se patent 
misuse as plaintiffs assert. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that a 
patentee may collect royalties post-expiration without violating Brulotte. 
The Court acknowledged “that the patentee could lawfully charge a royalty 
for practicing a patented invention prior to its expiration date and that the 
payment of this royalty could be postponed beyond that time[.]” Zenith 
Radio, 395 U.S. at 136. The problem arises when “the post-expiration 
royalties were not for prior use but for current use, and were nothing less 
than an effort by the patentee to extend the term of his monopoly beyond 
that granted by law.” Id. Thus, the SCIOS license does not violate Brulotte 
and defendant has not committed patent misuse. . . . 
  
The court finds that plaintiffs have not proven patent misuse on the 
issue of imposing royalties beyond the term of the patent. Thus, on this 
point, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment is granted. 
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NOTE: REACH-THROUGH 
ROYALTIES AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
 
The court found that Housey did not violate Brulotte because “the 
royalties to be paid after the expiration of [Housey’s] patent [were] for use 
of the subject invention prior to the expiration of the patent.” Bayer, 228 F. 
Supp. 2d at 472 (emphasis added).  One famous example of reach through 
royalties was Harvard University's "OncoMouse," a genetically engineered 
mouse created to have a high susceptibility to certain cancers, making it a 
very valuable tool for scientific research.  The patent on the OncoMouse 
expired in 2005.  See Brenda M. Simon, Patent Cover-Up, 47 HOUS.L.REV. 
1299 (2011) (describing the royalty provisions governing use of the 
OncoMouse while it was under patent).  The OncoMouse was widely 
regarded as challenging a tradition in science of using predecessors' 
research tools freely.  See Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared: 
Hybrid Exchange Strategies as a Source of Distinction at the Boundary of 
Overlapping Institutions, 116 AM.J.SOC. 341 (2010). 
 
Robin Feldman has described reach-through licenses as “I use your 
product now, but I can pay for it over an extended period of time,” up to 
and including after the patent expires. See Robin C. Feldman, The 
Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 Hastings L.J. 399, 
444 (2003). She argues that such licenses “should raise patent misuse 
concerns” because they can extend the time and expand the scope of a 
patent. For example, such agreements “may result in royalties paid long 
after the patent . . . has expired,” despite the fact that “[o]rdinarily, when the 
patent term ends, royalties should end, and the invention should be 
dedicated to the public domain.” 
 
Even if the use occurs during the period of the patent, she argues, 
“extending the time for determining the value of the use . . . violates the 
notion that patent holders have a limited time to capture a return on their 
inventions”:  
 
A patent is not a guarantee that a patent holder will earn 
anything. It is a time-limited opportunity to try to capture a 
return on an invention. The market may not be ready, for 
example, to appreciate the invention during the patent 
period. Nevertheless, one cannot ask the patent office to 
extend the patent for a few years on the grounds that the 
invention was ahead of its time and the market simply was 
not ready to appreciate its value. The market’s inability to 
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recognize or calculate the value of an invention is one of the 
hazards of having a limited patent term. 
 
. . . [T]he patent system has strong policy reasons for 
limiting the time of a patent grant. These include not only 
concerns related to anticompetitive effects but also concerns 
related to limiting wasteful and duplicative activities and 
creating disincentives to future inventors. Leaving open the 
time for determining and capturing the value of an invention 
threatens the overall balances struck by the current patent 
system. In particular, it shifts the patent system’s current 
allocation of reward between those who participate in the 
early stage of inventions and those who participate in later 
stages of invention. 
 
. . . [T]he process of invention is often evolutionary with 
one invention building on those that have gone before. While 
early stage inventors make an initial leap forward, later stage 
https://images-
statcont.westlaw.com/images/spacer13x13.gifinventors 
create further developments. Thus, many inventions are the 
product of successive contributions by multiple inventors. 
 
The structure of the patent system limits the reward that 
may be gained by early stage inventors in comparison to 
those who come later. Such limits enhance the overall 
progress of science by ensuring that those who create initial 
steps do not discourage those who would take the next steps 
by aggregating too much of the total available reward to 
those at the early stages. 
 
By leaving open the time for calculating the value of a 
current use, Reach-Through Royalties shift a greater portion 
of the total reward available for an invention to those who 
contribute to the early stages of invention leaving less for 
those who contribute later. This discourages later invention 
and disrupts the balances implicit in the current patent 
system. 
 
Feldman, id. at 443–447 (footnotes omitted); see also Natalie M. Derzko, In 
Search of a Compromised Solution to the Problem Arising from Patenting 
Biomedical Research Tools, 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 
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347, 393, 398 (2004) (proposing the elimination of reach-through licensing 
of biomedical research tools and arguing that “since the concept of [a reach-
through license] seems to inappropriately expand the monopoly rights on a 
patented research tool beyond the scope of the patent itself, it seems 
reasonable . . . that [reach-through licenses] can be a form of patent 
misuse”). 
 
Feldman also highlights the problem of “royalty stacking,” where “the 
presence of too many rights holders . . . inhibits the efficient exploitation of 
[an] invention.” Feldman, supra, at 447. Professors Michael Heller and 
Rebecca Eisenberg describe this scenario as a “‘tragedy of the 
anticommons,’ when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others 
from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.” 
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 698 (1998) 
(emphasis added). As Heller and Eisenberg explain, in the context of 
biomedical research, reach-through licenses cause royalty stacking because 
they give 
the owner of a patented invention, used in upstream 
stages of research, rights in subsequent downstream 
discoveries. Such rights may take the form of a royalty on 
sales that result from use of the upstream research tool, an 
exclusive or nonexclusive license on future discoveries, or an 
option to acquire such a license.  In principle, [reach-through 
licenses] offer advantages to both patent holders and 
researchers. They permit researchers with limited funds to 
use patented research tools right away and defer payment 
until the research yields valuable results. Patent holders may 
also prefer a chance at larger payoffs from sales of 
downstream products rather than certain, but smaller, upfront 
fees. In practice, [however, reach-through licenses] may lead 
to an anticommons as upstream owners stack overlapping 
and inconsistent claims on potential downstream products. In 
effect, the use of [reach-through licenses] gives each 
upstream patent owner a continuing right to be present at the 
bargaining table as a research project moves downstream 
toward product development.  
. . . . 
As [reach-through licenses] to use patented research tools 
multiply, researchers will face increasing difficulties 
conveying clear title to firms that might develop future 
discoveries. If a particularly valuable commercial product is 
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in view, downstream product developers might be motivated 
and able to reach agreements with multiple holders of 
RTLAs. But if the prospects for success are more uncertain 
or the expected commercial value is small, the parties may 
fail to bargain past the anticommons. 
 
Id. at 699–700.  
 
Heller and Eisenberg point out that intellectual-property owners who 
regularly deal with each other “have sometimes developed institutions to 
reduce transaction costs of bundling multiple licenses.” Id. at 700. For 
example, 
in the music industry, copyright collectives have evolved 
to facilitate licensing transactions so that broadcasters and 
other producers may readily obtain permission to use 
numerous copyrighted works held by different owners. 
Similarly, in the automobile, aircraft manufacturing, and 
synthetic rubber industries, patent pools have emerged, 
sometimes with the help of government, when licenses under 
multiple patent rights have been necessary to develop 
important new products. . . . Perhaps some of the problems 
caused by proliferating upstream patent rights in biomedical 
research will recede as licensors and licensees gain 
experience with intellectual property rights and institutions 
evolve to help owners and users reach agreements. The 
short-term costs from delayed development of new 
treatments for disease may be worth incurring if fragmented 
privatization allows upstream research to pay its own way 
and helps to ensure its long-run viability. Patent barriers to 
product development may be a transitional phenomenon 
rather than an enduring tragedy. 
 
Id. “On the other hand, there may be reasons to fear that a patent 
anticommons could prove more intractable in biomedical research 
than in other settings”: 
 
Because patents matter more to the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries than to other industries, firms in 
these industries may be less willing to participate in patent 
pools that undermine the gains from exclusivity. Moreover, 
the lack of substitutes for certain biomedical discoveries 
(such as patented genes or receptors) may increase the 
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leverage of some patent holders, thereby aggravating holdout 
problems. Rivals may not be able to invent around patents in 
research aimed at understanding the genetic bases of diseases 
as they occur in nature. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Heller and Eisenberg warn that “three structural 
concerns caution against uncritical reliance on markets and norms to avoid a 
biomedical anticommons tragedy.” Id. First, transaction costs are high 
because 
  
[m]any upstream patent owners are public institutions 
with limited resources for absorbing transaction costs and 
limited competence in fast-paced, market-oriented 
bargaining. [Furthermore], the rights involved cover a 
diverse set of techniques, reagents, DNA sequences, and 
instruments. Difficulties in comparing the values of these 
patents will likely impede development of a standard 
distribution scheme. . . . [Finally], licensing transaction costs 
are likely to arise early in the course of R&D when the 
outcome of a project is uncertain, the potential gains are 
speculative, and it is not yet clear that the value of 
downstream products justifies the trouble of overcoming the 
anticommons. 
 
Id. Heller and Eisenberg add that “[e]ven when upstream owners see 
potential gains from cooperation and are motivated to devise mechanisms 
for reducing transaction costs, they may be deterred by other legal 
constraints, such as antitrust laws,” where “[e]ven a remote prospect of 
facing treble damages . . . may give firms pause about entering into such 
agreements.” Id. 
 
Second, compounding these transaction costs are IP owners’ 
heterogeneous and often conflicting interests. “Intellectual property rights in 
upstream biomedical research belong to a large, diverse group of owners in 
the public and private sectors with divergent institutional agendas.” Id. For 
example, while government agencies like the National Institute of Health 
may use their intellectual-property rights to increase the public’s access to 
medical products, private firms are more likely to use their IP rights to 
“maintain a lucrative product monopoly that rewards shareholders and 
funds future product development.” Id. “When owners have conflicting 
goals and each can deploy its rights to block the strategies of the others, 
they may not be able to reach an agreement that leaves enough private value 
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for downstream developers to bring products to the market.” Id.  
 
Finally, Heller and Eisenberg argue that researchers’ cognitive biases 
make it difficult for them to bargain around the anticommons problem: 
 
People consistently overestimate the likelihood that very 
low probability events of high salience will occur. For 
example, many travelers overestimate the danger of an 
airplane crash relative to the hazards of other modes of 
transportation. We suspect that a similar bias is likely to 
cause owners of upstream biomedical research patents to 
overvalue their discoveries. Imagine that one of a set of 50 
upstream inventions will likely be the key to identifying an 
important new drug, the rest of the set will have no practical 
use, and a downstream product developer is willing to pay 
$10 million for the set. Given the assumption that no owner 
knows ex ante which invention will be the key, a rational 
owner should be willing to sell her patent for the 
probabilistic value of $200,000. However, if each owner 
overestimates the likelihood that her patent will be the key, 
then each will demand more than the probabilistic value, the 
upstream owners collectively will demand more than the 
aggregate market value of their inputs, the downstream user 
will decline the offers, and the new drug will not be 
developed. Individuals trained in deterministic rather than 
probabilistic disciplines are particularly likely to succumb to 
this sort of error. 
 
A related “attribution bias” suggests that people 
systematically overvalue their assets and disparage the 
claims of their opponents when in competition with others. 
We suspect that the attribution bias is pervasive among 
scientists because it is likely adaptive for the research 
enterprise as a whole. Overcommitment by individuals to 
particular research approaches ensures that no hypothesis is 
dismissed too quickly, and skepticism toward rivals’ claims 
ensures that they are not too readily accepted. But this bias 
can interfere with clear-headed bargaining, leading owners to 
overvalue their own patents, undervalue others’ patents, and 
reject reasonable offers. Institutional ownership could 
mitigate these biases, but technology transfer offices rely on 
scientists to evaluate their discoveries. When two or more 
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patent owners each hope to dominate the product market, the 
history of biotechnology patent litigation suggests a 
likelihood that bargaining will fail. 
 
 But aren’t reach through royalties simply a form of risk 
sharing, which may often facilitate innovation that would not 
otherwise occur?  If a researcher is impecunious and unable to pay 
research costs immediately, she may pay under a “contingency” 
arrangement that assess royalties against a successful product.  In 
principle, such an agreement is no different than a book publisher’s 
promise to an author that it will pay the considerable costs of 
publication in exchange for royalties in the future that will follow 
after market success.  If the book fails the publisher will lose, but if 
the book succeeds the publisher may earn a great deal.  The main 
difference is that the life of the copyright – approximately 100 years 
– is far longer than the life of a patent, but that should not affect the 
underlying economics of the transaction. 
 
 For example, suppose the researcher is embarking on a 
product that has a 25% chance of succeeding but may pay off 
handsomely if it does succeed.  The researcher needs a patented 
process in order to perform the research, but has few funds.  
Licensing the process costs little for the patentee, so its downside 
risk from failure is negligible; by contrast, paying for the license up 
front is a major commitment for the licensee.  Under these 
circumstances the efficient solution would be for the patentee and 
researcher to reach a contingency arrangement under which the 
royalty will come out of the proceeds of a successful conclusion of 
the project.  See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND 
RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Ch. 10 (2011). 
